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Abstract
California endured an extreme and prolonged drought from 2012 until the wet
winter of 2017, offering a fascinating yet tragic example of how drought impacts lives.
Despite this recent and stark phenomenon, there is surprisingly little information about its
effects and implications. This thesis aims to lessen this knowledge gap by asking how
severe the drought was, how well the state responded, and what policies or broader
political power dynamics would increase California’s water security. It answers these
questions by exploring the Golden State’s long and complicated water management
history, which is necessary to understand the current drought policy framework; then, it
collects the emerging literature concerning the drought’s multifaceted effects into one of
the first state-wide meta-analyses. With this perspective, it becomes clear that the most
severe drought vulnerability is in the agricultural sector—alone costing Californians
billions of dollars—but spreads into a host of other economic and ecological effects.
Australia provides an apt comparison and some potential lessons, including agricultural
water efficiency, market solutions, a more consistent drought culture, and innovative
water supply solutions. In addition to offering some infrastructure and public education
solutions, Australia’s example hints that the California state government may need to
assume a heightened enforcement and information-gathering role in order to more
efficiently manage scarce water resources. Nonetheless, as the State emerges from
drought and looks to an uncertain future—where the next drought may already be upon
us— the extent to which California proactively adopts drought strategies will not only
affect millions of lives and billions of dollars, but must be at the forefront of ethical,
forward-looking, and cost-minimizing resource management.
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Chapter 1: Exploring the Various Costs of the 2012 – 2017
Drought
Introduction
From 2012-2017, many California residents and even Americans at-large could
have noticed the lack of rain, urgent “drought” headlines, and directives from
governments and fellow citizens to reduce water use. This thesis aims to understand how
severe the drought was, explore the different ways it affected socio-economic and
ecological systems in California, evaluate how the state’s various political actors
responded, and suggest ways in which California may respond more effectively to the
increasing probability of more frequent and severe drought.
The short answer is that the drought cost the economy, in a conservative estimate,
nine billion dollars across various sectors. One of the most visible costs was to
agriculture—a sector which directly relies on and constitutes a large portion of
California’s water consumption. Switching from low to high value crops, fallowing an
extra 50 percent of land relative to non-drought years, increasingly inefficient
groundwater pumping, and losing tens of thousands of agricultural jobs cost the state
nearly six billion dollars. The drought reduced hydropower generation by 57,000
gigawatt hours, costing taxpayers $2.45 billion due to increasing out-of-state electricity
purchases and natural gas-powered electricity. In addition to increasing the carbon
dioxide emissions of all state electricity plants by ten percent, this shift ultimately
released more nitrous oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, and other smog- and
asthma-inducing compounds. The vast increase in groundwater pumping, especially in
the Central Valley, decreased future aquifer recharge potential and led to destructive land
6

subsidence—costs which are, so far, uncalculated. California’s state-wide vegetation
decreased its productivity, resulting in reduced air filtration and drastically decreased
carbon uptake (possibly to the point that certain ecosystems became net carbon-emitters).
Some species, such as freshwater fish and amphibians, were placed at a heightened risk
of extinction. Finally, the drought contributed to drastically over-budget firefighting
costs—placing billions of dollars of real estate in the wildland-urban interface at risk. In a
more detailed examination of these costs below, it becomes clear that there are various
incentives to implement legislative change to mitigate the costs of future drought.

Hydrologically Contextualizing the 2012 – 2017 Drought
It is important to contextualize the region’s climate and the ecological severity of
the drought. California enjoys a Mediterranean climate of rainier winters and dry
summers (Cooley 2015, 1). In addition to mild seasons, this climate is characterized by
periodic drought. Using instrumental data beginning in 1895 to complement 2000 years
of tree ring data, it is clear that drought is a fundamental feature of not only of California
but also much of western North America (Griffin and Anchukaitis 2014). These recorded
dry periods are often interannual—ranging in duration from a few years, to decadal
“mega-droughts,” even to centuries-long droughts (Robeson 2015). From 800 CE to the
present day, there were an estimated 66 uninterrupted dry periods (below the
precipitation mean) lasting three to nine years, 37 occurrences of 3- to 9-year drought,
and two occurrences (from roughly 900 to 1100AD, and from 1200 to 1350 AD) of
centuries-long droughts (Griffin and Anchukaitis 2014) (Stine 1994, 546). These
interannual droughts owe much of their nature to the quasiperiodic occurrence of the El
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Nino-Southern Oscillation, “drought-busting” atmospheric rivers, and other regional
pressure anomalies (Griffin and Anchukaitis 2014).
Even within that context, the 2012-2017 drought is extreme. This recent dry
period is the worst drought ever recorded during 120 years of instrumental measurements
administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric (Hanak, Mount, and Chappelle
2016). Within the three-year period, according to the Palmer Drought Severity Index
(PDSI), 2014 was the worst year of drought (Robeson 2015). That year, the National
Drought Mitigation center declared that 98 percent of California was in severe drought
and 22 percent was experiencing exceptional drought.
In addition, the 2012-2015 drought compares in important and sometimes
unprecedented ways to the roughly 2000-year record provided by tree-ring analysis and
longer-term extrapolation. From 800 CE to 2006 CE, there have been around six droughts
(in the years 1580, 1782, 1829, and 1841) more severe or similar to 2014’s one-year
precipitation measurements—providing the 2014 drought with a return period of 140-180
years. (Griffin and Anchukaitis 2014). However, combined with a more complex quantile
mapping model, the one-year 2014 drought has return period of 700-900 years (Robeson
2015). According to the more inclusive PSDI, which combines lack of precipitation with
other drought factors, such as temperature-effected evapotranspiration, 2014 was the
worst single drought year of the last 1,200 years in California according to historical
criteria (Griffin and Anchukaitis 2014). Again, according to historical criteria, the 20122014 drought period is a 10,000-year event, whose cumulative PSDI drought “score” is
more intense than any recorded drought—even droughts lasting between four to nine
years (Griffin and Anchukaitis 2014). Broadening the scope to include the entire drought,
8

the 2012 to 2015 period “has an almost incalculable return period and is completely
without precedent” (Robeson 2015).
As noted before, 2014 is not the driest year in the record, nor were 2012-2014 the
driest recorded years, yet the combined effect of the low precipitation in addition to
California’s hottest three-year period from 2012-2014 produced an astounding drought as
measured by the fairly holistic PSDI measurements (Cooley 2015, 1). Despite its
calculated historical rarity, as seen below in Figure 1., drought is a common, yet
increasingly long and severe, feature of California’s climate. Current atmospheric trends
related to climate change make California’s response to future droughts of similar or
greater intensity of utmost political, economic, and social importance. In addition, it
should be noted that lack of precipitation does not necessarily produce a “drought”, or
lack of water, felt by individuals. From a public policy perspective, a drought occurs
when there is inadequate water for water needs. A city with high intensity water-use, for
example, may experience a “drought” when there is a small decrease in rainfall not
serious enough scientifically to be categorized as a drought—and as such, institutional
flexibility and resilience must be analyzed in addition to physically experienced
precipitation.
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Figure 1.

(Figure from Griffin and Anchukaitis 2014)
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An analysis of California’s response to the drought must begin by exploring the
ways in which the state’s various biological and economic demands for water was met, or
not met, by supply. Of these countless interactions, several key areas relevant to policydecisions are: 1) agricultural production 2) the larger, non-agricultural economy, and 3)
the ecology. Examining the various direct, indirect, and non-market costs of the drought
must inform efficient public policy decisions regarding ways to mitigate those future
costs. However, it should be noted before delving into an exploration of historic costs
that, due to the complex and often less-visible nature of effects across many activities and
through time, droughts present a particularly subjective cost-analysis. Since few attempts
outside of the European Union have been made to piece together sector-specific costs
into a comprehensive cost-analysis, this is an area ripe for future scholarship (Logar
2013, 1).

Agricultural Production
California agricultural production is relevant to an evaluation of the drought’s
effects due to its large economic and water-usage impacts. The industry employs about
450,000 individuals, and output revenue totaled $47 billion in 2015—the highest of any
one state, and accounting for 13 percent of the Unites States’ total (California
Employment Development Department 2017; California Department of Food and
Agriculture 2017). California is responsible for 90 to 100 percent of the United States
total production of multiple crops, such as artichokes, dates, olives, figs, broccoli, grapes,
almonds, walnuts and pistachios (Cooley 2015, 10). Around 25 million acres are devoted
to farming and ranching, or about a quarter of the state’s total land area (2015-2016
CDFA).
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This multibillion dollar industry, by its very nature, is also inextricably and
intimately dependent on water resources. Of all the water that accumulates in California,
about 40 percent, or about 26 million acre-feet, goes to agricultural uses, roughly 10
percent to urban uses, and the remaining 50 percent goes towards various environmental
purposes. (Howitt 2014) Therefore, about 80 percent of water going to human uses goes
to agriculture (Water Use in California, Public Policy Institute of California), and about
76 percent of average annual groundwater extraction is used for agriculture (Cooley
2015, 5).
With such a large water-footprint, the agricultural industry felt the shock of
drought. The aggregate effect of production shifts and resulting indirect economic effects
cost the state $2.2 billion in 2014, $2.74 billion in 2015, and $603 million in 2016—a
combined $5.5 billion dollars. (Howitt 2014, ii) (Howitt 2015, 10) However, these costs
were spread unevenly. The Tulare Basin accounted for more than 80 percent of the state’s
increased groundwater pumping costs (Medellin-Azuara 2016 5), about 90 percent of the
fallowed land (Medellin-Azuara 2016 ES-2), and received 57 percent, or more than $3
million dollars, of the services provided by the Drought Emergency Assistance
(Medellin-Azuara 2016 11). And, as just mentioned, these costs came in many forms,
such as shifting crop production, fallowing land, paying for increased groundwater use,
and otherwise changing water-use habits.
From 2012 to 2015, while facing costly decisions to adapt to drought, many
Californian farmers utilized the state’s vast groundwater supplies to offset surface water
shortages. For example, in 2014, the average available surface water (26 million acre
feet) was reduced by about 25 percent (6.6 million acre feet), but farmers offset 75
12

percent of the decrease by pumping an additional 62 percent of groundwater (5.1 million
acre-feet) (Howitt 2014, ii). This increased groundwater’s share of agricultural water
supply from 31 to 53 percent (Howitt 2014, iii). Utilizing groundwater prevented farmers
from otherwise reducing water consumption, or in the most extreme cases, leaving land
dry. However, pumping groundwater is a costly maneuver. Groundwater extraction cost
California $454 million in 2014 (Howitt 2014, 2), $590 million in 2015 (Howitt 2015,
12), and $303 million in 2016 (Medellin-Azuara 2016 ES-1). Further complicating the
issue, decreasing water-table levels leads to increasingly costly technology and lower
yields, so that from 2012 to 2015 pumping costs increased $1.7 per acrefoot per year
(Medellin-Azuara 2016 ES-2). Finally, it should be noted that an annual groundwater
overdraft of about two million acre feet per year, which is not recharged naturally, is
unsustainable and poses a relatively new area of resource management (Moran 2015).
The 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act is California’s first statewide
regulation of groundwater management, but is likely too slow-moving to curb
groundwater use adequately and sustainably compensate for the roughly 15 million acrefeet of groundwater overdraft resulting from the 2012 to 2015 drought (Howitt 2015, 13).
In addition to acquiring water supplies via additional pumping, farmers responded
in other dynamic ways to reduce water demand. Some farmers moved away from lowvalue field crops, (such as alfalfa, grains, and irrigated pasture), some vegetables, and
melons, towards high-value perennial crops, tomatoes, and nut bearing trees (such as
pistachios, almonds, and walnuts). For example, from 2010 to 2015, nonbearing almond
acreage increased from 85,000 acres to 220,000 acres (Medellin-Azuara 2016, 4). The
shift to tree crops reduces short-term water needs, since immature trees use less than 2
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acre-feet of water annually, while many other crops use three acre-feet. In 2015 alone, the
shift to tree crops likely saved the state over 400,000 acre-feet of water (Medellin-Azuara
2016 4). This flexibility, which moved production from field crops worth about $1,500
per acre, to fruits and nuts generating about $7,500 per acre, helped absorb the short-term
revenue shock of increased water pumping costs and fallowing land. And, although
mature trees do increase water use per acre relative to most sugar crops, vegetables, roots,
fruits, and cereals, they are, more efficient water-users than dairy or beef (one almond
requires one gallon of water while one gallon of milk requires 880 gallons of water)
(Mekonnen 2011). And, although almonds require more water per acre, a more
economically and policy-relevant metric is revenue produced per acre-foot of water—or
the potential economic return of the water. By this metric, almonds produce more
revenue per acre-foot of water than many other crops: per acre-foot of water, almonds
return roughly $2500, while cotton and alfalfa return within the range of $65-$250
(Gleick 2004).
This crop shift has and will show variations spatially and temporally. The
Sacramento Valley performed much of the state-wide crop shifting, by increasing tomato
processing, perennial plantings, and reducing rice and field crops (Howitt 2015, 4). Of
course, some of these shifts in production must be examined with the knowledge that
perennials require time to mature and that bearing acreage of nuts, for example, will take
years to reflect any changes in planting land-use patterns. In fact, all new plantings
across the state decreased during the drought years, with the sole exception of pistachios.
(Cooley 2015, 7)
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When increasing groundwater supplies and shifting production are inadequate,
fallowing land is often the remaining option. This indicates that, for farmers with water,
the revenue of selling water outweighs the revenue of farming, or, for the farmers without
water, that water is too expensive to buy. By 2015, net water shortages irreplaceable with
groundwater pumping resulted in the fallowing of 542,000 acres, or about 6.5 percent of
total cropland and 50 percent more than is usually left fallow (Howitt 2015, 5). Farmers
directed water to more valuable produce, and so the vast majority of this fallowed land—
87 percent, in the case of the Central Valley—had previously been low-value field crops,
feed, or other annual crops. (Howitt 2014, 4). Nonetheless, fallowing land and changing
production cost the state 17,100 jobs in 2014 alone, largely affecting seasonal and parttime work in the Central and San Joaquin Valleys. (Howitt 2014, 10).
The 2012 to 2015 drought has therefore been quite impactful to the agricultural
sector, resulting in some unintended consequences for the broader economy. For
example, fallowing land throughout the Central Valley increased the risk of dust
exposure throughout the highway corridors (Medellin-Azuara 2016 ES-2). However, not
all of the change was necessarily bad—shifting production from field crops, which
require between 1 and 20 jobs per acre, to higher-intensity crops, such as tomatoes, which
require about 160 jobs per acre, has helped minimize agricultural employment loss
(Cooley 2015, 12). Overall, though, jobs were lost, and even the indirect and smaller
effects of the drought were negative. Widening the scope to include indirect effects to
employment, labor income, value added, and output types increases the drought’s total
agricultural costs by about three-fold (Howitt 2014, 3).
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In summary, a diverse Californian agricultural sector, benefiting in high almond,
walnut, and dairy prices due to other global market conditions, has remained fairly
resilient to the drought. Prominent adaptations included crop shifting, land fallowing, and
increasing groundwater usage, resulting in economic losses of about $5.5 billion, or about
5 percent of annual agricultural production. However, water transfers, which raised $66
million in 2014 agricultural revenues, and recycled water, which account for about 1
percent of agricultural water use, are still fairly untapped adaptive techniques (Cooley
2015, 5). In the case of water transfers, bureaucratically tangled agencies and opaque
consumer-facing data limit the scale and efficiency of a water market. Technology limits
the reach of recycled water. Finally, patchwork tort and legal frameworks impede
groundwater management. While this chapter analyzes the cost of the drought, those
aforementioned obstacles to reform will be discussed at greater length in recommended
policy analysis in Chapter 5.

Non-Agricultural Economy
In addition to the highly-publicized direct agricultural costs to California’s
economy, the 2012 to 2017 drought cost the state in sectors including energy,
infrastructure, urban and suburban water-use patterns.
Less surface water runoff directly reduced the state’s hydroelectricity production,
costing taxpayers $2.45 billion between 2012 and 2017 to switch to natural gas-produced
electricity (Gleick, 2017, 1). For context, hydropower, at 18 percent of production, is the
state’s second-largest electricity source. Natural gas accounts for roughly 61 percent of
electricity generation. However, during the four-year drought, hydroelectric generation
from the state’s 287 hydroelectricity generation plants—located mostly in the eastern
16

mountain ranged—fell by 57,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) to an average of 10.5 percent of
the state total (Gleick, 2017, 5). This reduction was costly. The state offset the reduced
hydroelectric generation primarily by burning more natural gas, increasing out-of-state
purchases, and expanding wind and solar generation (Gleick, 2017, 5). Taxpayers paid an
additional $2.45 billion over the course of the drought to pay for costlier electricity
sources, e.g., natural gas. In addition, the energy sector’s increased reliance on natural
gas caused California’s power plants to increase carbon dioxide emissions by 10 percent,
or 23 million tons, along with producing substantial amounts of nitrous oxides, volatile
organic chemicals, particulates, sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide, and other pollutants.
While the costs are unquantified in the literature, these emissions contribute to smog,
asthma, and other health effects.
Just as the drought has led to the indirect effects of increased natural gas
consumption, increased groundwater pumping leads to a host of geologic processes
which can ultimately damage surface-level structures. As mentioned above, the state
normally sees vast fluctuations in precipitation, which has long led farmers to rely on
groundwater. This is especially true of the Central Valley, which has both heightened
agricultural production and fewer surface water reserves. Groundwater overdraft in
aquifer systems composed of fine-grain deposits, such as clays, silts, and sandy soils, can
depressurize the systems and lead to a physical drop in ground levels. More than half of
the aquifer systems throughout the Central Valley are composed of fine-grain deposits
susceptible to subsidence (Faunt et al., 2016, 1). And, since 1962, the Central Valley
aquifer system has been depleted at an average rate of 1.85 km3/year. As such, the state
has a long history of subsidence, starting in the 1920s (Faunt et al., 2016, 2). In fact, by
17

1970, more than half of the San Joaquin Valley had dropped by one foot, and some areas
fell by 28 feet. The cumulative subsidence of California’s lands has been called the
“greatest alteration of the Earth’s surface” (Borchers 2016, ES-3).
During the most recent drought, subsidence caused many types of damages in
many areas, and has the potential to continue to be a costly effect of drought. Subsidence
effects fall into four general categories: loss of stream, canal, and river conveyance
capacity; degraded levees; damaged roads, building foundations, bridges, pipelines; and
the creation of earth fissures further damaging surface or subsurface infrastructure
(Borchers 2016, ES-2). Just as is the case with agricultural losses, subsidence damages
were not spread evenly. The San Joaquin valley has undergone various public and private
canal, bridge, pipelines, turnout, and storm sewers repairs (Borchers 2016, ES-3). Steel
groundwater well casings have experienced “wide scale destructive failure” in the face of
the Sacramento Valley’s subsidence (Borchers 2016, ES-3). The Edwards Air Force Base
runways, well casings, road, homes, erosion and flood risk have all been impacted in the
Antelope Valley (Borchers 2016, ES-3). Coachella Valley’s earth fissures risk damage to
canals and other structures (Borchers 2016, ES-3). Finally, the Mojave River Basin has
also experienced historic groundwater level declines, fissures, depressions, and
desiccation cracks (Borchers 2016, ES-3).
While these effects are documented, it is nearly impossible to comprehensively
calculate subsidence costs due to a lack of private reporting requirements and of adequate
monitoring systems in various water basins. (California Department of Water Resources
2014a, 1). However, for some scope, California paid about $2 billion for subsidence
repairs from 1955-1972 (Borchers 2016, ES-2). Looking forward, future subsidence is
18

most likely in the southern San Joaquin, Antelope, Coachella, and western Sacramento
valleys (California Department of Water Resources 2014a, 9). It is worth noting that
subsidence and groundwater overdraft permanently reduce the carrying capacity of
aquifers—in one study, by nine percent of the groundwater pumped—decreasing the
capacity to recharge during wet seasons as a safeguard for droughts (Smith et al, 2017
pg.5). It is also worth noting that agricultural shifts away from field crops and pastures to
perennials, although an adaptation to the 2012-2017 drought, is resulting in a “hardening”
of the state’s remaining agricultural demands—further making the agricultural sector less
adaptable in the future to drought (Faunt et al., 2016, 4).

Ecological Effects
Evaluating how the state handled the drought, in the narrowest sense, might
include only human effects over which state action might have an impact. For example,
the status of remote flora may not be of immediate interest to a public policy maker in
Sacramento. However, quantifying the drought’s impact on California’s ecology is of
public interest since policy-makers, scientists, and economists have already decided to
place value on environmental services, such as carbon sequestration and biodiversity.
Some of these ecological effects are of more intrinsic value, while others directly impact
the human economy—e.g. wildfire risk increased by dead foliage, or more prevalent
disease vectors. It is also worth noting the limits of our own present knowledge and
ethical concerns—that certain biological functions which now appear superfluous may
gain importance with more scientific understanding. In fact, since it would be unwise to
assume we can possibly know all scientific benefits, it is prudent to assume that an
ecological analysis will underestimate both the costs and values of services.
19

Nonetheless, it is possible and prudent to start with what is already known:
California’s vegetation suffered in its productivity capacities, affecting its carbon uptake
and air filtration. Other than in semi-deserts and the moist northern forests, the drought
reduced total plant surface cover, primary productivity and ecosystem respiration, leading
to a decrease in net ecosystem productivity (Chen 2016) (Copeland 2016). While
estimates do not yet exist for the most recent drought, Schwalm et al. calculated that the
Western United States’ vegetation productivity decrease by 63 grams of Carbon per
square-meter per year, which is a 22 percent decrease, in a drought from 2000 to 2004. In
fact, for grasslands—which comprise about one third of California’s ecosystems—the
habitat switched from acting a net carbon sink to a net carbon emitter—a flux which is
even seen in simple seasonal shifts. (Schwalm et al. 2017) (Xu 2004). This is not a
regional phenomenon; when Europe experienced a drought in 2003, its vegetation also
saw a 30 percent reduction in gross primary productivity and net carbon source, therefore
“contributing to positive carbon-climate feedbacks” (Chais 2005). In addition to reducing
carbon-uptake, reduced plant productivity also decreases its ability to absorb ozone
(Panek 2004).
The larger decreases in plant respiration and gross primary productivity caused by
drought impact species diversity, as well. This should be important to conservationists
and public policy-makers alike as the California Floristic Province, which is about
115,000 square miles spanning the coast and near-inland area of California and
southwestern Oregon, is a Conservation International “biodiversity hotspot” due to its
large number of endemic species. Sadly, the Floristic Province has already lost 70 percent
of its primary vegetation cover to human encroachment and is increasingly composed of
20

invasive species (Copeland 2016). Drought reduces the species richness of habitats,
particularly effecting rare species, shallowly rooted species, annual forbs, and invasive
annual grasses. Luckily, however, most plant communities were largely resilient and in
fact did not experience a change in species richness beyond non-drought expectations,
although they did experience decreases in plant cover (Copeland 2016). Nonetheless, the
reduced productivity of California’s herbaceous communities and reduced freshwater
runoff has a cascading effect through the ecosystem, from small delta smelt, to the
Amargosa vole, to larger, migratory animals (Worland 2015). Water birds that rely on
freshwater estuaries, rivers, and wetlands were “under extreme stress” during the drought
(Hanak et al. 2015). Even worse, eighteen native fish species, including Chinook salmon,
were at high risk and on the “brink of extinction” within this area (Hanak et al. 2015).
The likelihood of drought to increase the occurrence of invasive species is mixed.
Non-native plants actually were more negatively affected by the drought than native
species (as measured by species richness, phylogenetic and genetic diversity, etc.)
(Copeland 2016). However, those invasive herbaceous species may be better at gaining
new habitat during the wet seasons by filling in the lost plant cover left over from
drought. Native fish species, many of which are extremely vulnerable, faced increasing
invasive pressure because the drought “favor[ed] conditions for invasive species that
reduce the quality of habitat,” in addition to facing competition from fish released from
hatcheries (Hanak et al. 2015). Animal species, too, saw very mixed and species-specific
results, so that it would be ill-informed to claim that drought increases the presence of
invasive species (Cuddington 2016).
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While general claims about the proliferation of invasive species is difficult, the
data are clearer about how decreased primary productivity, increased fungal infections,
and insect infestations, have killed millions of Californian trees. Conifer and hardwood
forests cover roughly a third, or 13.4 million hectares of California. A century of fire
suppression has increased fuel density, and increasing temperatures have increased the
wildfire season by 73 days relative to 1970 (Hanak et al. 2015). From 2012 to 2015, lack
of water affected about 10.6 million hectares, or 888 million large trees, and severely
affected about 58 million trees (Asner 2015). Water scarcity, combined with the effects
of temperature, fungus, and insects, has resulted in a “large pulse of tree mortality”
(Asner 2015). While the specific magnitude of this mortality contains a range, the United
States Forest Service estimated that roughly 27 million trees died.
As may be expected, this huge pulse of tree mortality not only affects the
ecological quality of habitat, but has cost the state about a billion dollars in fire-fighting
costs and represents tens of billions more in fire-risk. During the 2012 to 2015 drought,
California experienced two of its three largest recorded fires, (Hanak et al. 2015) an
increase in the total number of fires, and an increase in the total acreage burned—largely
concentrated in the central mountain ranges (Hanak et al. 2015) (Park et al. July 2015a).
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) has largely been
forced to respond to active fires, rather than having a budget capable of proactively and
extensively reducing fuel, or having the capability (based on vicinity to human
habitation) to allow uncontrolled burns in remote areas. As a result, every year since 2000
(except a wet 2010 season) saw over-budget expenses (Guerin 2016a). The 2016
Soberanes Fire alone burned 132,127 acres and cost at least $229 million (Branson-Potts
22

2016). Of CAL FIRE’s budget, fire-fighting cost the state about $310 million in 2012,
$242 million in 2013, $402 million in 2014, $608 million in 2015, and, although it is still
in the process of being calculated, some $500 million in 2016—in addition to vast federal
contributions (State of California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection 2017).
While it is difficult to attribute any of those expenses to the drought, the state paid a total
of at least $1.4 billion during the drought on larger, more frequent fires occurring during
a wildfire season
The potential for future fires, given the number of dead trees and the propensity of
Californians to live in the “Wildland-Urban Interface,” not only is costly to suppress but
also endangers property. 263,152 Californian homes are in areas of “Extreme” fire risk,
382,293 homes at high risk, 136,913 homes at moderate risk, and 8,322,108 homes at low
risk (CoreLogic 2016). The Reconstruction Value of extreme risk properties is $90
billion dollars, and $163 billion dollars for high risk homes (CoreLogic). Both the
quantity and value of these risky properties is foremost compared with all Western states,
exemplifying California’s propensity to build houses in the scenic, but dangerous,
“Wildland-Urban Interface.” A prime example highlighted by the CoreLogic Report is
the Riverside-San Bernardine-Ontario major metro area. The population base increased
from 1.5 million in 1980 to 4.2 million in 2010, pushing habitations to the mountain
foothills and beyond. 51,000 properties are at Extreme wildfire risk, with a reconstruction
value of $15 billion (CoreLogic 2016).
To summarize, the sheer size and scope of calculated drought costs is daunting: in
the agricultural sector of fallowing land, shifting production, and increasing groundwater
pumping; in the larger economy of changing energy production, subsidence, and shifting
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water habits; and in the ecological world of plant wellbeing and carbon sequestration,
biodiversity, and fire damages, amounting to at least $9 billion in calculated costs. The
total cost will continue to rise as science and economic analyses shed light on the
biological costs of climate change, biodiversity, and pollution.
With these costs, the analysis of drought mitigation gains focus. Certain patterns
become clear, such as various actors taking short-sighted actions which do not fully
acknowledge future costs or large externalities. Such is the case building homes in the
Wildland-Urban Interface (in 2002, FEMA reported that 38 percent of new homes were
built in or adjacent to the Wildland-Urban Interface), and pumping groundwater to
immediately satiate the needs of water-intensive and likely unsustainable industries at the
cost of current subsidence and future aquifer storage (United States Fire Administration,
2002). However, many obstacles stand in the way of policy or incentive shifts. Since the
gold rush, groundwater rights have a tangled legal and legislative history of nonregulation and senior rights, first curbed by the Sustainable Ground Water Management
Act of 2014. In addition, lack of scholarship regarding ecological costs, private urban and
suburban costs, and water levels or extractions will increase the uncertainty of costbenefit analysis. Nevertheless, the unpredictable nature of drought means that time is a
costly and irretrievable resource to spend deliberating options, and great effort should be
made to be ahead of, rather than retroactively reacting to, drought.
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Chapter 2: Trends in Drought Severity, Length, and Other Factors
As explored in Chapter 1, the most recent drought incurred various costs, to
various sectors, over various time frames—with far-reaching socioeconomic and health
impacts. As will now be explored in this chapter, certain trends, namely increasing
temperatures, increasing drought likelihood, decreasing groundwater sustainability, and
increasing urbanization, are critically important to any forward-looking drought
mitigation policies. California has implemented some local initiatives and a few statewide laws and regulations to increase drought tolerance. However, in light of the
magnitude of the drought’s cost as well as environmental and political drought trends,
California has some serious drought vulnerabilities that merit further scrutiny. In
particular, projected temperature, precipitation, wildfire, and demographic shifts not only
will contribute to the many facets of drought risk, but also nuance discussion around
potential drought mitigation strategies.
Average Temperature
From a climatic and environmental perspective, California is projected to
experience warmer temperatures with wildfire, water availability, ecological, economic,
and social ramifications. The warming itself is predicted by a host of scientifically-robust
models. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates emissions scenarios,
ranging from “stringent mitigation” scenarios (resulting in roughly 550 carbon dioxide
particles per million by 2100) to baseline scenarios “without additional efforts to
constrain emissions” resulting in closer to 1,000 carbon dioxide parts per million by the
year 2100 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014, 8). Researchers have
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evaluated these emissions scenarios with a range of atmospheric models, each with
differing sensitivities.
It should be noted that, in addition to being determined by many world-wide
emissions scenarios, California’s projected temperature trends are not uniform across the
year or the state—instead, summer months would warm more in absolute values than
winter months, and northern, more inland areas will warm more quickly than southern or
coastal locations. In the low-emissions model, while winter temperatures increase 2.2 to 3
degrees Celsius, summer temperatures increase 2.2 to 4 degrees Celsius (Hayhoe et al.
2004). In the higher emissions model, the difference is more pronounced: winter
temperatures increase 2.3 to 4 degrees Celsius, while summer temperatures increase 4.6
to 8.3 degrees Celsius (Hayhoe et al. 2004). These summer increases, which are up to
double the winter temperature increase, are especially important for ecological
evapotranspiration functions and irrigation needs. Not only do temperature models vary
based on the time of year, but also based on location. Since water has a large thermal
capacity, temperatures are not expected to rise as dramatically near the Pacific coast.
Instead, the models predict that inland temperatures will, on average, increase about
twice as quickly as coastal locations (Cayan et al. 2008, 7). Furthermore, the northern
and northeastern parts of California are projected to see the most warming as the century
progresses, which, importantly for policy-making, is where much of the state’s snow
accumulates (Hayhoe et al. 2004).
Despite these spatial and temporal variations, the warming trends are clear. Even
by 2034, under the entire range of emissions scenarios California’s temperature is
projected to increase by at least 0.5 degrees Celsius (Cayan et al. 2008, 6). By mid26

century, the different emissions scenarios start to diverge in temperature predictions,
ranging from 1.35 to 2 degrees Celsius (Hayhoe et al. 2004). By 2100, the high-emissions
scenario more fully diverges, so that the annual mean temperature could increase between
1.5 and 5.8 degrees Celsius (Cayan et al. 2008, 1) (Hayhoe et al. 2004). This range of
estimations spans the modern temperature difference in yearlong averages between
Monterey and Salinas (a 1.4 degrees’ Celsius difference) to the modern difference in
yearlong average highs between San Francisco and Long Beach, Los Angeles (a fivedegrees Celsius difference) (Cayan et al. 2008, 5; National Centers for Environmental
Information 2010). This trend will be a lasting phenomenon—researchers suggest that
this warming should be an expected feature of California’s climate “at least” through the
twenty-second century (Cayan et al. 2008, 5).
Extreme Heat
This average annual temperature shift will have outsized effects on extreme heat
conditions. The hottest temperatures experienced an average of 5 percent of the year (i.e.
18 of the year’s hottest days) between 1961 and 1990 will account for 12 to 30 percent of
days in 2070-2099 (Hayhoe et al. 2004). The length of the Californian heatwave season is
projected to increase between 5 and 13 weeks by 2099, and the number of heatwave days
in Los Angeles could increase four to eight times from the city’s historic average
(Hayhoe et al. 2004). Extreme heat days, which are in the highest 99.9 percentile of the
summer’s historical average (as measured form June to September), are projected to
increase 50 to 500 times by 2099 (Cayan et al. 2008, 7). As explored further later in this
chapter, these heatwave trends impact morbidity and human water needs.
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Precipitation – Rain and Snow
While the temperature projections vary in magnitude yet are consistent in
direction, precipitation models are less conclusive. Generally, overall 2100 precipitation
levels are projected to change by less than 10 percent across California (Cayan et al.
2008). Those changes are predicted to slightly increase winter while decreasing summer
precipitation, yet with the combined effect of a “tendency toward slight decreases” in
precipitation (Hayhoe et al. 2004). These small average precipitation trends might be met
with a “modest tendency for increases in the numbers and magnitudes of large
precipitation events” (Cayan et al. 2008, 9). However, even a 10 percent total
precipitation change is quite impactful for California, since a year with 15 percent less
precipitation is among the lowest/driest third of annual totals, and because runoff is a
non-linear precipitation function (such that less precipitation results in disproportionally
less reservoir-filling runoff) (Cayan et al. 2008, 20).
Although the average precipitation total may not change much across the state,
warming temperatures would decrease snow accumulation rates, which are currently
quite important for California’s year-long water needs. Theoretically, higher temperatures
through the winter combined with earlier springs mean that the precipitation will more
often fall as rain rather than snow, and warmer temperatures melt accumulated snow
more quickly. Under the various emissions models, snow water equivalent (SWE) losses
by 2100 could range from 37 to 94 percent at elevations below 3,000 meters—which is
where 80 percent of snowpack storage currently occurs (Hayhoe et al. 2004). The total
SWE losses including all elevations are still severe, with predicted decreases between 29
to 89 percent (Hayhoe et al. 2004). Even by midcentury, changes in snow accumulation
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could likely decrease the annual reservoir inflow (which averaged 21.7 km3 from 1961 to
1990) by as much as 20 percent (Hayhoe et al. 2004). Snow pack is a major source of
California’s year-long surface-water. The Central Valley groundwater system, which is
integral to California’s agriculture, receives about 85 percent of its recharge precipitation
from snowfall in the Sierra Nevada Mountains and the Klamath Mountains (Scanlon et al.
2017). In addition to decreasing the total snow accumulation, warmer temperatures mean
that the spring snowmelt would occur between five and thirty days earlier (Cayan et al.
2008, 2). This would increase the risk of earlier spring-time flooding, and force reservoir
managers to maintain empty flood protection space in reservoirs through the winter at the
cost of water storage for the drier summer and fall seasons (Hayhoe et al. 2004).
Wildfire
Unfortunately, earlier snowmelt produces drier soils and vegetation later in the
summer and fall—facilitating California’s increasingly frequent and severe wildfires.
These wildfires, as discussed in Chapter 1, threaten lives and properties. And,
unfortunately for human habitation, the California wildfire season is increasing in length
and severity to rates last seen before Euromerican colonization and fire control strategies
(Miller et al. 2009). In fact, compared with the historical 1970 to 1986 average, the
state’s average fire season from 1987 to 2003 has increased by 78 days (Westerling et al.
2006). Fire seasons will likely continue to grow with warming climates, since the
increased season-length—spread relatively equally between earlier spring ignitions and
later fall fires—is significantly correlated with regional spring and summer temperatures.
The 78-day increase was seen in a period that was 0.87 degrees Celsius warmer than its
historical comparison—which is an important trend when temperatures, according to the
29

previously-discussed models, can increase another degree or two by mid-century. And
these fire seasons are growing in not only length, but severity. Compared with the 1970
to 1986 average, wildfires now occur nearly four times more frequently and burn six
times more land (Westerling et al. 2006).
Groundwater
Beyond increasing the length and severity of the fire season, climate changes and
decreased snow accumulation will pressure Californians to increasingly rely on
groundwater consumption rather than snow-fed water reservoirs. Drought increases
agricultural pumping needs while decreasing aquifer recharge capabilities.
Simultaneously, the increasing almond and perennial acreage is “hardening” farms’ water
demand compared with more easily fallowed annual crops. The implications of this more
inflexible year-to-year water demand means that the farmers would seek to maintain
water consumption during droughts with more groundwater. Without accounting for
future “hardening” irrigation demands or increased evapotranspiration in hotter climates,
California groundwater pumping has historically increased 180 percent during droughts
(Scanlon et al. 2017).
The drier, agriculturally-intense and groundwater-dependent Central Valley will
be at the forefront of this sustainability battle. The Central Valley aquifer spans 52,000
square-kilometers, with extensive agricultural land use (53 percent of the land over the
aquifer is cropland). That agricultural use is fairly intensive, such that 90 percent of that
crop- and pastureland is irrigated, and about 50 percent of crops are produced with flood
irrigation (Scanlon et al. 2017). For some context, from the 1860s until 1960, 60 cubic
kilometers of water had been removed from the California’s estimated 1,000 cubic
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kilometers of pre-irrigation water reserves (Scanlon et al. 2017). About 80 cubic
kilometers were removed between 1960 and 2003, and 20.3 Cubic kilometers of
groundwater were removed from the Central Valley from 2003 to 2011. As can be
deduced by those numbers, groundwater depletion is increasing. 40 Cubic kilometers
were lost during the 2012 to 2016 drought alone (Xiao et. al. 2017). This rate of
groundwater depletion throughout California, but especially in the agriculturally-intense
and groundwater-dependent Central Valley, may have “potentially dire consequences”
spanning from the drying up of wells, to stream and lake reductions, to deteriorating
water quality, to increasing pumping costs, to land subsidence. (Perlman 2016;
Famiglietti et al. 2011). Figure 2 illustrates basin-specific groundwater extraction totals,
as well as showing the recharge in wetter months and over-drafting during droughts. It
should also be noted that the Tulare Basin, in particular, is facing extreme aquifer
depletion and intense agricultural use, such that even though the lifespan of the entire
Central Valley aquifer is 390 years, it is “much shorter” in the Tulare basin (Famiglietti et
al. 2011).
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Figure 2.

(Figure from Scanlon et. al. 2012.)
Drought and Extreme Heat
And while groundwater aquifers may slowly recharge during wetter years, and
although overall precipitation levels may only decrease slightly, California droughts are
increasing in likelihood. Some researchers have concluded that “anthropogenic warming
has increased the probability of the co-occurring temperature and precipitation conditions
that have historically led to drought in California” (Diffenbaugh et al. 2015). In fact, the
proportion of “dry” or “critical” years is projected to increase from 32 percent in the
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historical (1961-1990) period, to between 50 to 64 percent by the end of the century
(Hayhoe et al. 2004).
It is worth briefly exploring some socio-economic impacts of these climactic
trends. From an agricultural perspective, warmer temperatures and potentially drier
summers will increase the evapotranspiration needs of vegetation. Agriculture would
therefore require an increasingly large water input, further straining and potentially
decimating groundwater reserves. Tens of millions of federal dollars provided temporary
relief for those who lost farming jobs which likely would not exist without high
groundwater-use, and tens of millions more of relief dollars provided direct emergency
water needs (Stevens 2017). New agricultural pests may successfully colonize California,
and pest incidences will likely increase (Trumble and Butler 2008). Even growing
seasons might be effected—grapes could see a shift in ripening time of one to two
months, and would likely see a decrease in product quality as a result of temperature
sensitivity (Hayhoe et al. 2004). From a social perspective, warmer temperatures and
increasingly common extreme heat events could contribute to heat-related mortality. In
fact, Los Angeles could see anywhere between a two- to seven-fold proportional increase
in yearly heat-related deaths with decent acclimatization, and a further 25 percent
mortality increase without such acclimatization (Hayhoe et al. 2004). Additionally,
hundreds of homes in the Central Valley were forced to rely on bottled water when their
wells ran dry during the 2012 to 2017 drought (Rocha 2014).
California’s Demographics
Finally, California’s population growth—and increasing urbanization—are an
important drought-relevant trend. After all, drought’s policy relevance stems from how it
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interferes with human demand. With a current size of more than 39 million people,
California’s population is predicted to reach 50 million by 2050 (Johnson 2017).
Increasing water efficiency will therefore remain of paramount political importance,
since water availability may slow or alter population growth. The current projection is
that this growing population will be increasingly urban in nature. Therefore, urban water
use will be an important policy front. Currently, about one-fifth of non-environmental
water, equaling an average of 9.1 million acre-feet per year, goes toward urban use.
About 64 percent of that “urban use” water goes towards residential water. About half of
that urban water use goes towards both residential and non-residential outdoor uses, such
as watering landscapes, washing sidewalks, or filling pools (Natural Resources Defense
Council and the Pacific Institute 2014a). Although per capita urban water use does show
the potential to decrease during drought conditions (lowering from an average 200
gallons per day during the 1970s to 2000s, to 130 gallons per day in 2015), and are more
efficient than agricultural per capita uses, the sheer magnitude and increasing proportion
of urban dwellers makes it an increasingly important efficiency and demand-side
conservation focus. The various regional per capita water needs, and the aggregate water
consumption, can be explored more in depth with Figure 3.
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Figure 3.

(Figures from Natural Resources Defense Council and the Pacific Institute 2017; and the
Public Policy Institute of California 2016)
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Chapter 3: California’s Water History and 2012-2017 Drought
Responses
Successful drought mitigation policies in California must account for these
temperature, precipitation, groundwater, wildfire, and demographic trends. Additionally,
future policies must also complement and address the current Californian policy scheme.
The next question is, then, in what ways does California currently respond to drought?
What is the legislative framework around water rights, and in what ways did California
adapt to the 2012 to 2017 drought?
These related questions require both historical perspective and contemporary
understanding. California has a long and complicated relationship with water, resulting in
a complex regulatory and water-rights adjudication framework, which, for the purposes
this thesis’ scope, begins with the Spanish in 1769. The California Supreme Court ruled
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries that the state’s water rights law incorporates the
Spanish rule of “pueblo” rights, which gives water rights to the municipal descendants of
Spanish-founded pueblos. This was perhaps most important in Los Angeles’ battle to win
all water rights of the Los Angeles River and its hydrologically connected groundwater
(Hanak et. al. 2011, 21).
The Anglo-American regime—sparked by John Marshall’s 1848 gold discovery
southeast of present-day Sacramento—has been extraordinarily influential in shaping
California’s water policy landscape. Within six decades of the initial gold discovery,
California went from a population of about 160,000 (only about 10,000 of whom were
not indigenous), to more than 1.5 million (Hanak et. al. 2011, 22). The Gold Rush, in
fact, was a very water-intensive process, and by 1880 miners had built more than 6,000
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miles of canals, ditches, and flumes to transfer water long distances into the mountain
ranges, where it was pressurized and used to blast away rock (Hanak et. al. 2011, 23).
Not surprisingly, the environmental effect was drastic: every winter and spring, more
than a million acre-feet of debris-filled water washed down to the San Francisco bay,
forming a 200 mile-long temporary “inland sea” in the Central Valley which covered
fields and orchards in mining debris (Hanak et. al. 2011, 24-25).
The Gold rush not also had drastic environmental effects, but also helped shape
enduring water-rights principles. First, the constant need to build levees in order to
protect land from catastrophic mining-caused flooding helped spur the formation
hundreds of water reclamation and irrigation districts, which are now characteristic of
California’s agricultural landscape (Hanak et. al. 2011, 25). In addition, the hydraulic
miners themselves developed a long-lasting water rights scheme. Responding to the
conditions of intense water need, high economic return, water shortages, and individuallevel bargaining (rather than any state involvement), both water and gold were subject to
a “first-in-time, first-in-right” rule. This principle was eventually officially recognized
and enshrined by the California Supreme Court in 1855 as an efficient and valid
allocation scheme, especially in times of shortage. However, this senior water rights
pattern came into conflict with an already extant form of water rights stemming from
English and American common law: riparian rights. Rather than a first-come, first-serve
allocation, a riparian rights system ensures all landowners next to rivers and streams
share the water rights. In times of shortage, water rights are allocated to riparian
landowners based on “reasonable use” (Hanak et. al. 2011, 23). The “first-come”, or
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“appropriative” system of Gold Rush miners, on the other hand, was based on actual use
rather than land ownership, and involved no place-of-use-restrictions.
By the late 19th century, the gold rush was drawing to a close, and the conflict
between those two water right schemes was mounting. Mining was declared a “public
nuisance” because the economic benefit of mining was being outweighed by the pollution
and threat to other economic sectors, such as the era’s rapid agricultural growth. The
tension between riparian and appropriative rights came to head in “one of the great legal
cases in California history,” Lux v. Haggin (1886), pitting three of the state’s wealthiest
individuals against one another in the Tulare Basin. A 4-3 decision in favor of riparian
rights meant that riparian users would often take precedence over appropriative users and
that riparian users should only be limited by the “reasonable consumption” of other
upstream riparian users (Hanak et. al. 2011, 28). Since then, the California constitution,
in Article X §2, has enshrined the doctrine of reasonable use as the basis for all water
rights and conflict resolutions—even in disputes between a riparian and appropriative
water rights holder. This uneasy equilibrium and “reasonable use” doctrine, however,
remain a point of interpretation—especially during times of drought.
Economic and demographic changes contributed to water rights changes
throughout the late 19th and early 20th century. For example, Californian farmers
increased agricultural land holdings beyond the natural floodplains—a development
which required extensive irrigation and water management. The 1887 Wright Act
combined earlier reclamation district laws and principles in order give local governments
primary water management responsibilities, such as acquiring new water rights, building
dams and canals to store and distribute water, selling bonds, and imposing property
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assessments. This period helped establish modern California’s numerous decentralized
irrigation and water management districts.
By the 1900s, diesel and gasoline technological advancements ushered in the era
of groundwater exploitation. Common law regarding groundwater use had previously
been that a landowner with access to an aquifer could pump indefinitely, but the
technological race quite literally to the bottom—to the deepest well—resulted in many
water conflicts. The California Supreme Court weighed in on the matter in 1903 with
Katz v. Walkinshaw, and acknowledged that the previous “free-for-all” system “was no
longer compatible with California’s hydrologic and economic conditions” (Hanak et. al.
2011, 32). Instead, the court extended basic surface water riparian reasoning to include
groundwater—i.e., that all overlying landowners had a right to the system’s “safe yield,”
and, like surface water, disputes and shortages among landowners should be resolved by
allocating water based on “reasonable use” (Hanak et. al. 2011, 32). However
conciliatory and forward-looking this 1903 ruling may have been, no regulatory body
stepped forward to enforce the meaning of the ruling. Irrigation districts continued to
focus on water development rather than conflict resolution or conservation; and instead of
decreasing groundwater use or reallocate to “reasonable” uses in times of shortage, many
communities simply imported more water (Hanak et. al. 2011, 32).
In these ways, California’s legal water system included some riparian and
appropriative rights, many irrigation districts, increasing demand for water projects, and
unregulated groundwater extraction. Another important historical component to
understand California’s water responses is the federal government’s role. Beginning with
the Manson-Grunsky Plan in the late 1890s to address flooding in the Sacramento Valley,
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the federal government stepped in to help expand local projects into regional endeavors
necessary, for example, to satiate Los Angeles’ and San Francisco’s rapidly growing
water needs (Hanak et. al. 2011, 34). Local populations did not necessarily take kindly to
the municipalities’ buying of water rights and removing local waters—in fact, protesters
repeatedly dynamited the Owens Valley Aqueduct when it first began transporting water
240 miles south to Los Angeles (Hanak et. al. 2011, 35).
Nonetheless, complex instances of federal assistance and regulation have
continued to influence California water policy. Congress passed the federal Reclamation
Act of 1902 largely “under pressure from western farmers who had suffered through two
decades of almost constant drought and by western politicians who had witnessed the
failure of local and regional water projects because of insufficient capital” (Hanak et. al.
2011, 40). The original Act created the Bureau of Reclamation within the Department of
the Interior, authorized the construction of dams and irrigation projects throughout many
western states, and provided subsidized water costs to farms smaller than 160 acres. What
started as a project to help struggling farmers and local governments, however, grew
unthinkably immense in size and impact. From the Hoover Dam to the Grand Coulee, the
Bureau of Reclamation has constructed more than 600 dams and reservoirs and, with 53
power plants providing more than 40 billion kilowatt hours for 2.5 million homes, is the
country’s second largest producer of hydroelectric power (United States Bureau of
Reclamation 2017). It supplies water to 31 million people across the West and one out of
five Western farmers, who in turn produce 60 percent of the nation’s vegetables with 10
million acres of government-irrigated land (ibid.). It is difficult to imagine how such
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large Western cities as well as the current scope and productivity of Western farming
could have been possible without the Bureau’s water projects and electricity generation.
While purely federal projects are still an important part of California’s water
scheme, many more projects have been joint state-federal enterprises. Take, for example,
possibly the most consequential project in Californian water history. What started as the
1919 Marshall Plan (Robert Marshall being a U.S. Geological Survey hydrologist at the
University of California) shifted into the first State Water Plan of 1930, was finally
turned into the federal Central Valley Project in 1935 (the Great Depression made federal
funding much more appealing) resulting in the Central Valley Project. This massive
reworking of the Central Valley drastically altered the San Joaquin and Kern rivers,
created the Shasta Dam, and set up an extensive system of pumps and canals in the Delta
in order to provide water for farmers in the Sacramento Valley, the San Francisco Delta,
the northern San Joaquin Valley, and even Tulare county (Hanak et. al. 2011, 44).
Unfortunately, these hydrologic changes decimated salmon and steelhead spawning,
practically eliminated California’s previously expansive freshwater wetlands, which went
from covering more than a quarter of the state’s area in 1960, to just 4.9% by 2002, and
greatly diminished any natural flood control capability (Hanak et. al. 2011, 45). Both
ecologically and economically the project has been very impactful in shaping modern
California. Today, the Central Valley Project—still controlled by the Bureau of
Reclamation—is the largest water distributer and manages about seven million acre-feet
of water annually—about 90 percent of which is used for irrigation (ibid.).
California has also been responsible for creating and managing its own water
projects. In fact, the State Water Project was designed to parallel and even complete the
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Central Valley Project. In 1959, the state sold $1.75 billion in general obligation bonds—
nearly equal to the entire state’s annual budget and the largest bond measure in the
nation’s history—and redirected oil revenue to finance the project. 5.8 million
Californians voters approved the project referendum by just three-tenths of one percent,
the smallest margin in state history (Hanak et. al. 2011, 50). Nonetheless, the measure
passed, and the State Water Project—still owned and operated by the state—continues to
be a major player in California’s water rights and allocation landscape. The California
Aqueduct, which is the main artery of the SWP, supplies water for 25 million
Californians and about one million acres of farmland (California Department of Water
Resources 2010).
The State Water Resources Control Board
This complex history of water rights, irrigation projects, and federal/state water
projects has left much to decide and enforce by regulatory agencies. Unlike the largely
unregulated water landscape of the 1800s, California introduced its main water regulatory
body in the twentieth century. The 1913 Water Commission Act moved beyond the “rules
of prior appropriation developed by the gold miners and the courts" in order to create a
State Water Commission—later to be the State Water Resources Control Board. This
legislation and commission compromised the first regulatory system to administer new
surface water rights, and the Water Commission itself has grown to manage the
monitoring of permittee water uses, defend water users, protect fish and wildlife, and
enforce the mandates of reasonable use and the public trust (Hanak et. al. 2011, 38).
However, political pressure from various interests resulted in many exemptions of
what could and, most especially, what could not be regulated by the Water Commission.
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In fact, pueblo rights, riparian rights, and groundwater rights were completely exempt
from regulation. In addition, any appropriative rights granted prior to 1914, called “pre1914 rights” were also exempt from regulation. As a result of those many exemptions,
today the State Water Resources Control Board monitors and regulates less than half of
the water actually used by agricultural and urban interests (ibid.).

Overview: Responses to the 2012 - 2017 Drought
With this historical framework to understand California’s complex federal, state,
and local irrigation and reclamation interests, in addition to the main regulatory
component and water-rights schemes, next comes the question of how the state
specifically responded to the most recent drought.
The existing infrastructure and interregional nature of California’s water supply
immeasurably helped the state survive the driest years. 2012 heralded the start of dry
conditions, especially for areas within the San Joaquin Valley and inland Southern
California, but the state’s extensive water supply infrastructure “greatly mitigates the
effect of short-term (single year) dry periods to users of managed supplies, although
impacts related to unmanaged systems (increased wildfire risk, stress on vegetation and
wildlife) remain” (California Department of Water Resources 2015b, 6). In fact, the
Central Valley’s dynamic water trading network effectively increases the natural recharge
time for its water buyers seven-fold (Scanlon et al. 2017). Northern California’s rainy
early 2013 further helped to alleviate southern agricultural pressures. Luckily, the
Colorado River Basin, which collects water from as far north as Wyoming, continued to
provide substantial reservoir water supplies and full water deliveries to lower Colorado
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River Basin contractors in Southern California (California Department of Water
Resources 2015b, 3).
Critically, though, rural areas were effected first and most seriously. Rural
agricultural users are more directly dependent on annual and seasonal rain for their
livelihoods and are usually the first water users to experiences the effects of drought
(California Department of Water Resources 2015b, 5). Not only are rural areas more
seriously affected by drought due to the nature of their water use, but also due to the
nature of their water-extraction systems. Urban areas have been able to afford building
more reliable infrastructure, while rural communities have been unable to do so.
Therefore as the dry summer of 2014 continued, small water systems and rural residents
dependent on private wells, unfortunately vulnerable because they are often built over
fractured rock, experienced surface and ground water shortages (California Department
of Water Resources 2015b, 4).
Yet as the drought wore on, more users beyond the agricultural sector were
gradually affected, and local, state, and federal forces responded with a myriad of
executive, legislative, and voluntary actions. While some of these actors seem slow to
react, it should be kept in mind that there is no statutory definition of “drought” in
California. Washington is the only western state to have such a definition (when "water
supply for an area is below 75 percent of normal and the water shortage is likely to create
undue hardships for various water uses and users"), but the aforementioned regularity of
California dryness makes such categorizations difficult (California Department of Water
Resources 2015b, 10). After all, there is meteorological drought, which is below average
precipitation, hydrologic drought, which is below average runoff, and then qualitative
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drought, which is a shortage of water for a particular purpose (California Department of
Water Resources 2015b, 5).

State Responses: Legislative Action
From a legislative standpoint, the state first reacted in March 2014 “to assist
drought-affected communities and provide funding to better use local water supplies”
(Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. 2014). This measure provided a total of $687
million dollars to drought relief—$549 million of which was dedicated to accelerating
Proposition 84 and Proposition 1E bond grants to fund local agencies’ projects
(California Department of Water Resources 2015, 3). The bill therefore largely
accelerated and funded local initiatives, with the goal of “assist[ing] drought-affected
communities and provid[ing] funding to better use local water supplies” (Office of
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. 2014).
Just a few months later, the legislature passed “perhaps the most significant
legislative water initiative in California in half a century” (University of California, Davis
2017). In September of 2014, after another warm, dry summer, a three-bill package
collectively known as the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) passed
both legislative houses. As previously explored, access to groundwater had largely been
in a free-for-all state since the Gold Rush. SGMA explains that the state’s huge reliance
on groundwater (which constitutes more than half of California’s water consumption in a
drought year) incurs various external costs (California Code uncodified findings, passed
2014). The bill notes that “groundwater resources are most effectively managed at the
local or regional level” in order to meet the goal of “prevent[ing] long-term overdraft”
and avoid six “significant and unreasonable” costs, namely: “(1) lowering of groundwater
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levels, (2) reduction in groundwater storage, (3) seawater intrusion, (4) water quality
degradation, (5) land subsidence and (6) impacts on beneficial uses of interconnected
surface waters” (California Code § 10721, passed 2014).
To meet this sustainable groundwater management goal, the bill prompts the
California Department of Water Resources to analyze and sort groundwater basins by
“medium” and “high” priority. Currently, the 127 basins qualifying as medium or high
priority represent approximately 96 percent of California’s groundwater use and contain
88 percent of the state’s population (California Department of Water Resources 2015a).
The bill requires that regional and local authorities in those basins to form Groundwater
Sustainability Agencies (GSAs), which then prepare and implement local Groundwater
Sustainability Plans (GSP), and, in doing so, will have the power to set sustainable goals,
assign groundwater extraction allocations, and allow groundwater transfers (University of
California, Davis 2017; Nylen et. al. 2017). In forming a timeline, SGMA specifies that
localities must establish their GSAs by June 2017—which, according to the Department
of Water Resources, “99 percent of the basins” accomplished (California Department of
Water Resources 2017a). The GSAs must begin to implement those plans by 2022 for
medium priority basins and 2020 in critically over drafted basins, and these GSPs must
achieve groundwater sustainability by 2040 (University of California, Davis 2017). The
Department of Water Resources released other regulations and requirements for the
formation of GSAs, and the quality of GSPs (ibid.).
In these ways, the bill aims to manage California’s groundwater extraction
sustainably by empowering local agencies—albeit with some state requirements—with
aid, a central timetable, and an enforcement mechanism. Some scientists and policy46

makers, however, warn against the ineffectiveness of the bill since it does not require
GSAs to collect extraction data from individual wells, the State Water Resources Control
Board has not been explicit in articulating its reactions to noncompliance, and because of
the sustainability timeline length (Warnert 2016). This timeline, as one article in Nature
warns, could take decades to fully implement (AghaKouchak 2015). The enforcement
question will also be particularly important. So far, although 99 percent of medium- to
high-priority basins do currently have a GSA, as of February 12, 2018, ten discrete areas
still are “not covered by a GSA, adjudication, or alternative plan” and are therefore
considered “unmanaged areas” (California Department of Water Resources 2017a; State
Water Resources Control Board 2017f). The State Water Resources Control Board “sent
letters to [the] property owners” of those unmanaged areas, which are not yet compliant
with SGMA, to inform them of new reporting requirements (ibid.). Any person extracting
groundwater—except for “small domestic well users” totaling less than two acre-feet of
groundwater per year—by law must now file yearly extraction reports detailing well
location, capacity, monthly extraction volumes, place and purpose of water use, and well
owner information, in addition to paying a $300-per-well Reporting Filing Fee and $10
per-metered-acre-foot and $25 per-non-metered-acre-foot (State Water Resources
Control Board 2017c). However, it is unclear how the State Water Resources Control
Board (which acts as the enforcement agency, while the Department of Water Resources
acts as the Regulating and Assisting Agency) could verify how many wells an owner
actually owns versus claims to own, measure non-metered water-use, and whether it will
sue well-owners who are not compliant (Kiparsky 2016; Division of Integrated Regional
Water Management and Sustainable Groundwater Management Section 2016).
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Senate Bill 88, passed in June 2015, marks the legislature’s next response to
address the state’s lack of water diversion data, enforcement loopholes, and the rural
water crises (California Water Boards 2018). To target the water crises, the bill allows the
state to consolidate water systems which have failed to provide quality drinking water. In
the words of the Water Board itself, Senate Bill 88 “is crafted to expedite permanent
solutions for failing water systems and those that have run out of water due to the
drought” (State Water Resources Control Board 2016, 2). According to the State Water
Resources Control Board, roughly two percent of California’s public water systems do
not reliably meet all state and federal drinking water standards, and are therefore liable to
be consolidated with larger systems (ibid.). However, the Board has not announced any
forced consolidations, and instead has online guidance for localities to initiate their own
consolidation process—reminding them that “water systems are eligible for up to $5
million in zero interest loans for completing a consolidation project with a disadvantaged
water system, if applicable” (State Water Resources Control Board 2017a). While the
ability of the State Water Resources Control Board to monitor and enforce these
requirements has yet to be fully tested, the new ability to force water system
consolidation is a dramatic increase in Board power.
To target the lack of water data, the bill authorizes the State Water Board to adopt
regulations which mandates that any water diverters of more than 10 acre-feet of water or
more per year install measurement instruments and submit monthly water-use data
(California Code passed 2015). This new measurement requirement applies to
approximately 12,000 water claimants across the state out of the roughly 13,000 junior
rights holders (i.e. non-riparian, post-1914 rights) (State Water Resources Control Board
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2017d; Burke, Dearen, and Tumgoren 2011). And finally, to target some enforcement
loopholes, the bill eliminates the restriction that the $500 per day maximum fine for
violating water conservation mandates is only applicable during at least 3 years of
drought or during an official emergency declaration—instead, the fine can be levied at all
times (California Code 2014). A person can be charged at any time with the criminal
infraction of “excessive” water use “such as allowing landscape watering to spill into
streets,” or other SWRCB-defined actions (California State Water Resources Control
Board 2017h). Additionally, individuals may be fined up to $25,000 for willfully
misstating water use information or tampering with a water measuring device (ibid.).
However, local water suppliers can craft their own “excessive-water-use-rules.” For
example, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Powers responded to one Bel-Air
resident who used 11.8 million gallons of water (33 acre-feet) in a year by instating a
$1,000 to $40,000 per month fine for “unreasonable use” (Stevens 2016). As with the
other sections of SB 88 and SGMA, however, it is still unclear how and to what extent
the Water Resources Control Board will enforce its share of monitoring requirements. In
fact, it is currently unclear how often—if at all—the Control Board has levied excessive
water-use fines.
The California legislature therefore responded to the drought by funding various
water projects, introducing a groundwater sustainability framework, mandating reporting
requirements, and providing emergency food and water relief, but the full effects of these
changes will take time to materialize for several reasons. Firstly, the phase-in clauses and
time necessary for agency decision-making mean that many of the bills’ various
measures, reporting requirements, etc. have only recently been enacted in 2017, 2018, or,
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as is the case of groundwater sustainability plans, will not be finalized until 2022. Not
only were the bills structurally designed to take time to enact, but, since most of these
measures largely empower local or regional entities to take initiative, the full impact and
long-term effectiveness of these measures is dependent upon local initiative. Finally, the
regulatory component is not yet finalized—the State Water Resources Control Board has
yet to resolve some ambiguities in how it will manage the new responsibilities of
increased enforcement, and how transparently the agency will store the new water-use
information. In sum, the state legislature helped fund many measures, enacted some
short- and long-term reform, but largely played a reactive role which left localities, the
executive branch, and the federal government to respond to the drought.

State Responses: The Executive Branch (Governor’s Office and State
Agencies)
In comparison with the legislature, the executive branch responded to the drought
earlier, in more ways, and more often throughout time.
The earliest action came in May 2013, when the Governor’s office responded to
growing agricultural concerns by issuing Executive Order B-21-13, a directive to “the
Department of Water Resources (DWR) and the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) to expedite review and processing of water [and water rights] transfers,” and
to create a drought coordinator within the Department of Water Resources (California
Department of Water Resources 2015, 3; Edmund G. Brown Jr. 2013).
By December 2013, the Governor formed a state interagency Drought Task Force,
comprised of the Secretary of the Department of Food and Agriculture, Director of the
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Department of Water Resources, State chairwoman of the State Water Resources Control
Board, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Services, to assess dry conditions,
review expected allocations, judge California’s “state of preparedness,” coordinate with
local and federal agencies, and recommend state actions—ranging from policy to a
formal drought declaration (ibid.; California Department of Water Resources 2015, 3).
With information from this Task Force, Governor Brown issued a far-reaching
emergency proclamation on January 17th, 2014, with mandates for agencies and nonmandatory requests for Californians. The declaration also called upon the Department of
Water Resources to coordinate with other state and local agencies to “execute a statewide
water conservation campaign to make all Californians aware of the drought and
encourage personal actions to reduce water usage” by 20 percent (Office of Governor
Edmund G. Brown Jr 2014). The Department of Water Resources was also ordered to
monitor groundwater conditions, provide a public update by April 30th, 2014, identifying
water shortages and monitoring weaknesses (the Sustainable Groundwater Management
Act was later passed in September 2014). The Department of Fish and Wildlife was
tasked with evaluating risks to threatened and endangered species, and the California
Department of Food and Agriculture launched a website connecting farmers to state and
federal programs, and later provided $3.75 million for competitive irrigation grants via
State Water Efficiency and Enhancement Program (Office of the Governor of California
et. al. 2017). Finally, the declaration demanded that the Drought Task Force “will
immediately develop a plan that can be executed as needed to provide emergency food
supplies, financial assistance, and unemployment services in communities that suffer high
levels of unemployment from the drought. ... and will advise [the Governor] of
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subsequent actions that should be taken if drought conditions worsen” (Office of
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. 2014).
With another executive order on April 25th, 2014, Governor Brown again pleaded
with Californians to limit wasteful water use, asked the State Water Resources Control
Board “to adopt emergency regulations as necessary to direct urban water suppliers to
limit wasteful outdoor water use practices,” and ordered that the Department of Water
Resources “conduct intensive outreach to local agencies to increase their groundwater
monitoring in areas of significant impact” (California Department of Water Resources
2015b, 3). Executive orders issued in September and October of 2014 gave additional
funds and directives to the Water Resources Control Board, Department of Water
Resources, and office of Emergency Services to assist local agencies in dealing with
emergency drinking water shortages and wildfires, respectively (California Department
of Water Resources 2015b, 5; California Exec. Order No. B-27-14).
An executive order on April 1 st, 2015, marked the first truly widespread
mandatory state-wide water savings. The Governor ordered the State Water Resources
Control Board to achieve a 25 percent reduction in potable urban water usage through
February 2017, ordered the Department of Water Resources, partnering with local
agencies, to replace 50 million square feet of lawns with “drought tolerant landscapes,”
and directed the California Energy Commission to “implement a statewide appliance
rebate program to provide monetary incentives for the replacement of inefficient
household devices” (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. 2015). A few months
later, the California Department of Water Resources announced the allocation of $30
million in rebates to meet the Governor’s lawn and appliance goals. These “turf and
52

toilet” rebates pay households $100 to replace one toilet and up to two dollars to replace
one square foot of lawn (California Department of Water Resources 2015d). Californians
largely managed to comply with Governor Brown’s mandate, and from June 2015
through February 2016, cumulatively reduced their water use by twenty-two percent
relative to the same months in 2013—conserving enough water to supply a third of the
state’s population for one year (California Department of Water Resources 2017b).
Perhaps reflecting greater political salience and public knowledge of the issue, the South
Coast hydrologic region contributed almost 60 percent to total statewide water savings in
certain months (ibid.). Despite these successes, the State Water Board’s Office of
Enforcement did send out nearly 100 warning letters, 117 information orders, 12
conservation orders, and four Administrative Civil Liability Complaints to various water
suppliers by February 2016 (California Department of Water Resources 2015c). What is
lacking in those numbers is how effective intervention was at inducing behavior changes
and whether the Water Board had the resources to communicate with as many violators
as needed.
Between these various agency actions, grant programs, and other initiatives,
California appropriated $3.7 billion for the drought between 2014 and 2015 (The
California Natural Resources Agency 2015, 2). However, the drought showed no signs of
stopping.
On May 9th, 2016, Executive Order B-37-16 “established a new water use
efficiency framework for California” by requiring longer-term water conservation
measures, including “permanent monthly water use reporting, new urban water use
targets, reducing system leaks and eliminating clearly wasteful practices, strengthening
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urban drought contingency plans and improving agricultural water management and
drought plans” (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. 2016). To accomplish these
goals, the State Water Board complemented its percentage-based local reduction goals
with a more holistic and forward-planning approach requiring localities to ensure at least
a three-year water-supply under drought conditions (State Water Resources Control
Board 2017b, 1). In addition, Governor Brown approved using an addition $255 million
in the 2016-2017 budget in a “Drought Spending Package” which provided emergency
food, drinking and sanitation water, fire protection, and public outreach programs (Office
of the Governor of California et. al. 2017, 6).
Throughout 2016 and early 2017, many agencies attempted to tackle the broad,
multi-faceted effects of drought. The State Water Resources Control Board continued to
update and extend resolutions regarding water quality, financial assistance programs, and
prohibitions on wasteful practices (Office of the Governor of California et. al. 2017).
CAL FIRE restricted open residential burns, and required “burn permits” in the majority
of counties (Office of the Governor of California et. al. 2017, 5). The Department of
Social Services’ Drought Food Assistance Program provided over two million food boxes
to nearly one million households in drought-affected communities with high levels of
unemployment. Nearly 62 percent of these food distributions occurred in the Tulare
Basin, which encompasses Fresno, Kern, Kings, and Tulare County (Office of the
Governor of California et. al. 2017, 6). The Labor Workforce Development Agency used
federal funds to create more than one thousand “drought-related public works projects”
through the Drought Temporary Jobs program (ibid.). And the Department of
Community Services and Development partnered with the Department of Water
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Resources to implement the Toilet Retrofit Program—installing over 10,000 highefficiency toilets and saving more than 37 million gallons of water (ibid.).
Finally, on April 7th, 2017, the Governor Brown ended California’s drought state
of emergency except for Fresno, Kings, Tulare, and Tuolumne counties, where the state
would continue to provide emergency drinking water project. Despite ended the statewide emergency, the 2017 executive order “maintains water reporting requirements and
prohibitions on wasteful practices,” but largely left the degree of sustained regulations to
agency-discretion (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr 2017a).
However, it should be noted that 170 state agencies compromise this incredibly
complex governmental corpus, with much of the relevant water regulatory powers within
the State Water Resources Control Board, Department of Food and Agriculture,
Department of Water Resources, and Department of Fish and Wildlife. Collaboration
between agencies proved difficult, and responsibility often dissipated between agencies
to more forcefully react to the drought. In addition, federal agencies share some
regulatory and operational duties. This collaboration therefore included discussions
among the United States Bureau of Reclamation and Department of Water Resources—
the Central Valley Project and State Water Project operational agencies, respectively—as
well as the State Water Resources Control Board, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and
National Marine Fisheries Service.

State Responses: Other
In addition to the many legislative and executive methods described above,
California’s state government analyzed and adapted to the drought in a few other key
ways: via other spending mechanisms, university research, regional partnerships, and
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integration with federal programs. These multi-faceted avenues were of somewhat
limited importance in the 2012 to 2017 drought, but show promise in future drought
response.
Spending Mechanisms
Some of the state’s largest drought funding was not approved or even introduced
by legislators, but instead directly enacted by voters via the ballot initiative process. This
process, which “gives California citizens a way to propose laws and constitutional
amendments without the support of the Governor or the Legislature,” requires at least
365,000 signatures and the Attorney General’s verification (California Department of
Justice 2016). Many individuals were frustrated by what appeared to be a slow legislative
response to drought, and instead called for additional funding measures. On November
4th, 2014, Californian voters approved Proposition 1—called the Water Quality, Supply,
and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014—at the statewide general election. This Act
authorized the state to issue $7.5 billion in general obligation bonds “to finance a water
quality, supply, and infrastructure improvement program” (California Department of
Water Resources 2014b). Those funds, to then be appropriated by the State Legislature,
would be used on direct state expenditures and competitive grants to localities to
integrate regional water management, increase regional water security, fund water
conservation and efficiency projects, and help meet urban water use targets. The ballot
initiative process shows continued promise as an avenue for water policy in order to
circumvent potential business lobbying in the legislature. Already numerous ballot
measures will be decided at the June 2018 primary election, one of which stipulates that
property owners with rainwater capture systems would not need to have their property
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reassessed “as the law now requires, saving them from paying higher property taxes.”
This measure, which incentivizes building rainwater storage systems, echoes similar
measures in the 1980s for solar panels and fire sprinklers. The water savings could be
substantial—a 1,500-square-foot roof with 12 inches of annual rainfall can collect about
10,000 gallons of water (Rogers 2018a).
University/Academic Research
While ballot initiatives provide an impactful way for citizens to directly and
quickly prompt state government action, the state has also funded key academic research
that analyzes the many impacts of drought and drought-policy. To exemplify this
involvement, the California State University at Monterey Bay and Scripps Institution of
Oceanography at the University of California at San Diego are listed among “key
partners and stakeholders” on the federal government’s page for California’s Drought
(National Integrated Drought Information System). The Scripps Oceanography Institute
not only conducts its own research, but has been very involved in state and federal
governmental partnerships by contributing expertise, for example, to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s “California-Nevada Climate Applications
Program” (California-Nevada Climate Applications Program). The University of
California at Davis’s Center for Watershed Sciences has produced some of the most-cited
academic papers on the drought’s costs and impacts 1 and runs the “California Drought
Watch,” a user-friendly website centralizing research, news, and water “tips for
practicing and embracing sustainable living” (University of California, Davis 2014).

1

For example, this thesis cites Howitt et. al. on multiple occasions.
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Many of these drought-focused scholarly articles are funded directly by universities and
California State agencies. From 2016-2017, the Department of Water Resources
contributed more than $3 million on climate and precipitation research, the California
Department of Forestry and Agriculture spent about $200,000 studying the “economic
impact of drought” (California Legislative Analyst's Office 2016). In these ways, the
state’s annual $12 billion higher education budget, in addition to project-specific funding
from state agencies, has greatly contributed to the state’s drought response, public
awareness, and scientific data (Cook 2017).
Regional Partnerships
The state of California has also engaged in some regional-level partnerships of
note, such as the Western States Water Council (WSWC) and the Western Governors’
Association. The Western States Water Council, created during the 1965 Western
Governors’ Conference, is comprised of more than 150 representatives appointed by
governors of eighteen western states, filling roles within executive, legal, non-tribal
federal water needs, tribal reserved water rights, water information, water quality, water
resources, and clean water act jurisdiction committees and subcommittees (Western
States Water Council “Members” 2018). Its main goals are currently to foster
“cooperation among its member states” “in the conservation, development and
management of water resources” as well as to create a forum of discussion among
member states and federal interests (Western States Water Council “About” 2015). The
WSWC accomplishes these goals with a core annual structure of four Council meetings
and one annual report. Additionally the WSWC hosts workshops for target groups,
organizes symposiums for the public, publishes and even commissions more specialized
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reports (Western States Water Council “Past Meetings”). However, its original mission
was to “examine the prospects for cooperation among its member states in water
development and transfer on an interregional scale”—but “finding common ground” for
this interregional water-transfer goal has remained “elusive” (Western States Water
Council 2005, 3).
The second main interstate partnership is the Western Governors’ Association,
which is comprised of twenty-two governors from Guam and American Samoa to Kansas
and Oklahoma. Convening annually, the Association releases letters, resolutions, and
spearheads different initiatives. One of its three current initiatives is the “Drought
Forum”--launched in 2014 by then-Chairman Brian Sandoval of Nevada. The Forum
aims to facilitate the flow of information among states of “best practices on drought
policy, preparedness and management” by accumulating a “drought resource library”
(Western Governors' Association). These “foundational tools” for policy-makers of
innovative case studies and communications platform will hopefully fulfill Governor
Sandoval’s note that “Western states will continue to thrive, even with the threat of
drought, so long as we work together and make the most of the water we have” (Western
Governors' Drought Forum 2015, 3). However, it is impossible to know how often or
with what reliance state and local policy-makers have utilized this resource.
State-Federal Partnerships
In addition to interstate and regional partnerships, the state has responded to
drought in various forms of collaboration with federal efforts. Mostly these partnerships
provide expertise, data, or funds, rather than adding stakeholders to decision-making
processes. For example, NOAA’s National Integrated Drought Information System has
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acted as a partner to the Western Governors’ Association’s Drought Forum, and often
federal agencies help sponsor various state projects. The importance of federal
compliance and aid to maximize the efficacy of drought policy is underscored by the
presence of WestFAST (the Western States Federal Agency Support Team), a
consultative body representing twelve federal agencies, within the Western States Water
Council.

Federal Responses
As such a mixed regulatory and operational framework might indicate, the most
recent drought, as well as future drought, not only elicit state-level responses and
partnerships, but also federal responses. Expectations of federal response and aid
influence state and local policy, and must be accounted for when examining the ways in
which California can feasibly respond or adapt to future drought.
As early as the 1880s, the federal government has helped California manage
destructive mining floods (Hanak et. al. 2011, 15). Federal involvement “expand[ed]
dramatically” through the 1900s, as exemplified by the Central Valley Project’s
construction and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s ongoing role as its regulator and
water allocation supplier (ibid.).
The federal government’s many agencies continue to have a complicated
regulatory relationship with California’s water management system, ranging from the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service influencing ecological outcomes to the Labor Department
providing emergency funds. There are also some federal programs and entities which are
focused specifically on California or the southwest region, such as the EPA’s Region 9,
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U.S. Forest Service’s Region 5, and the Department of Interior’s Southwest Climate
Science Center.
These complex relationships show the various levels of federal aid to California
during the 2012 to 2017 drought. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Services
Agency administers financial assistance programs for farmers and ranchers experiencing
floods, drought, quarantines, or other natural disasters. Between 2012 and 2014, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture had, at various times, listed each of California’s counties on
its list of Primary Natural Disaster Areas—a designation which makes counties eligible
for certain emergency programs (California Department of Water Resources 2015, 6).
The Secretary of Agriculture can declare a county a drought disaster area if there was at
least a 30 percent loss in crop production, or the county can automatically become a
drought disaster area if U.S. Drought Monitor has classified it as being in severe drought
for eight consecutive weeks (ibid.). Due to these designations, the USDA’s Farm
Services Agency delivered about $414 million in programs and loans to farmers and
ranchers across the state (United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Service
Agency).
In addition to the USDA programs, in 2015 the White House announced that it
would spend about $300 million on drought assistance programs in the western states—
and “much of the new spending [went] to California” (Stevens 2015). The U.S.
Department of Labor’s National Dislocated Worker Grant program, which offered 2,080
hours of employment on drought-related public works projects for workers affected by
drought, enrolled more than thousand participants and cost about $18 million (Office of
the Governor of California et. al. 2017, 6). California received another $10 million to
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provide emergency water for rural communities, and $6.5 million for “projects to
improve water management over the next two years” (Stevens 2015).

Local Governments
As the 2012 to 2017 drought impacted more people, more severely, Californians
responded with a range of collaborative actions addressing issues and providing more
immediate results than state or federal projects. One course of action for Californians lies
within their county or municipal governments. By the end of the drought, the State had
received 55 local Emergency Proclamations—ten from cities, 22 from counties, 11 from
tribal governments, and 12 special districts such as water or utility districts (Office of the
Governor of California et. al. 2017, 7). These Emergency Proclamations are announced
under “conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property
within the territorial limits of a county, city and county, or city, caused by such
conditions as air pollution, fire, flood, … [or] drought… which are or are likely to be
beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of that political
subdivision and require the combined forces of other political subdivisions to combat”
(California Gov. Code §8558). Such a Proclamation is therefore an acknowledgement of
extreme conditions, laying the groundwork for future government response, but does not
immediately necessitate any action per se. Although 22 counties declared Emergency
Proclamations, 36 counties never did, despite the National Drought Mitigation’s 2014
declaration that 98 percent of California was in severe drought and 22 percent was
experiencing exceptional drought. This might point to different localities’ belief that their
services, personnel, and facilities were in adequate shape to handle the drought, or it may
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point to either a lack of political organizing or lack of data about the drought’s impact on
the county.
While some localities responded to the drought more forcefully than others,
collaborative units that amplify and unify smaller agencies proved impactful in the most
recent drought, and may become increasingly important to drought response. For
example, the Association of California Water Agencies (ACWA) is the United States’
largest such public water coalition. Its members include more than 430 public water
agencies (in turn governed by locally-elected boards, varying greatly in size, structure,
and function.) which collectively deliver 90 percent of all the water that goes to cities,
farms, and businesses (Association of California Water Agencies 2018a). Structurally,
ACWA organizes its membership into ten geological regions, each with its own chair and
vice chair, in addition to 14 committees, such as the Groundwater Committee and the
Water Quality Committee, which recommend action to the 37-person Board of ACWA.
This state-wide collaborative entity offers educational services for all Californians, as
well as member-specific tools, such as “priority bulletins,” conferences, and toolkits for
the publicity and policy interpretation of certain issues.
It is unclear, however, the extent to which member water agencies utilize such tools
while making decisions. To its credit, ACWA notes that its member water agencies have
invested $20 billion over the past two decades to strategies such as recycling, local and
regional water storage, cutting edge water-use efficiency, and desalination of seawater
and brackish groundwater (Association of California Water Agencies 2018b). In
addition, ACWA partnered with the California Department of Water Resources to jointly
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manage California’s official water conservation education program, “Save Our Water”
(ibid.).
Californian municipalities and utilities also found federal partnerships fruitful to
provide funding and expertise. For example, Californian utilities partnered with
WaterSense—a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency program which helps identify and
promote water efficient homes and living habits. This utility-EPA partnership has shown
great promise and growth in response to the drought: from 2010 to 2018, the number of
such WaterSense partnerships doubled from 300 to 600 (United States Environmental
Protection Agency 2015, 2). These collaborations have produced many local initiatives.
For example, the Sonoma-Marin Saving Water Partnership help “Drought Drive-Up”
events (giving more than 5,000 households free “drought kits” including efficient
showerheads, faucet aerators, and other products), and the San Diego County Water
Authority partnered with the Home Depot to host a San Diego County Garden Friendly
Plant Fairs which offered buyers subsidized low water-need plants (ibid.).

Individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations
As counties, cities, localities, and collaborative agency collectives coordinated action,
other drought reactions were precipitated by existing non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) or new NGOs created specifically in response to the drought. The Water
Education Foundation’s Online Water Encyclopedia, in fact, currently lists 35
environmental organizations involved in water issues, ranging from smaller entities such
as the Bay Nature Institute, Water Reuse Association, and Sacramento River Preservation
Trust, to larger national NGOS such as the Sierra Club, which has 13 California chapters
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(Water Education Foundation 2018). All of these NGOs offer a powerful and promising
way to engage many different stakeholders, centralize knowledge and decision-making,
and outsource action from governments to more adaptable organizations.
Some of these NGOs are briefly highlighted below in order to showcase their
respective actions and point to areas of future drought mitigation impact. The Sustainable
Conservation, founded in 1993, “bring[s] together business, landowners and government
to steward the resources that we all depend on in ways that make economic sense”
(Sustainable Conservation “about”). The Conservation works on specific projects such as
simplifying the permitting process for environmental restoration work and a “Waste Not”
project, and sponsors the California Leopold Conservation Award to honor “landowner
achievement in voluntary conservation” (Sustainable Conservation “Leopold
Conservation Award”). The Conservation duly notes that celebrating and encouraging
such action is quite important: “because more than half of California is privately owned,
how landowners manage their properties has a dramatic and lasting effect on the
environment – from clean air and water, to thriving wildlife to a healthy climate” (ibid.).
In these ways, the Conservation addresses specific local environmental projects and
promotes local action.
The Almond Board of California, on the other hand, is a more business-oriented
organization which nevertheless provides an avenue to affect change in one the state’s
heaviest water-use sectors. The Board does not currently have permanently standing
committees or projects around water-use; however, it is funding a groundwater recharge
research site on one almond-grower’s orchard (Almond Board of California 2017). The
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Board then invited members of the California Water Action Collaborative to explore the
project’s results, efficacy, and potential scalability.
The California Water Action Collaborative (CWAC) began as an informal corporate
working group after the Los Angeles-hosted 2014 Water Action Hub of the CEO Water
Mandate (a public-private initiative established by a 2007 UN Global Compact).
Formalized in 2016, the Collaborative has three main goals: “driv[ing] corporate water
stewardship,” “build[ing] social capital for improved local water management,” and
retuning “water to natural surface water and groundwater systems” (Khalamayzer 2016).
Currently, CWAC is comprised of 20 organizations, including major non-profits, global
Fortune 500 companies (e.g. the Coca-Cola Company and the Campbell Soup Company),
investors, agricultural producers, and environmental foundations (California Water
Action Collaborative). Together, this collaboration provides funding for a variety of local
projects, in addition to spearheading its own initiatives such as a current endeavor to
increase drip irrigation and fertilizer/water data collection for dairy farmers in the San
Joaquin Valley.
While NGOs help bring stakeholders together, finance projects, and coordinate
action, individuals also played an important role in California’s response to the drought
by changing their water-use habits. Because over 28 million people—87 percent of the
state’s total population—live in urban areas, this non-agricultural “individual
Californian” perspective will focus on urban residential water use. The magnitude of
urban and suburban water usage, although it may seem small compared with the sheer
quantity used for agricultural purpose, is still significant. Of the 104 million acre-feet of
water withdrawals per year in California, about half, or roughly 52 million acre-feet per
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year, go to environmental uses such as maintaining rivers federally protected as “wild and
scenic,” ensuring water quality, and preserving wetlands (Public Policy Institute of
California 2016). Then, about forty percent, or 25 million acre-feet per year, is used by
California’s nine million acres of irrigated farmlands (ibid.). Finally, about ten percent,
which is 9 million acre-feet per year, is provided for all urban use (California Water
Science Center 2011). Furthermore, 64 percent of California’s total urban water supply
goes to residential uses. Institutions and businesses account for the next 23 percent of
urban water consumption, followed by the manufacturing industry at 6 percent (Natural
Resources Defense Council and Pacific Institute 2014a, 2). Due to the previouslymentioned increasingly urban Californian demographic, the ability of this residential
sector to adapt to drought will be instrumental to successful drought mitigation.
However, information gaps limit the degree of domestic consumption analysis
possible in California. The two major forms of water data collection unfortunately are not
yet published or compiled in a user-friendly way. The California Department of Water
Resources itself acknowledges that “easily retrievable, standardized, and comprehensive
baseline urban water use data are not available in California” (Cahill and Lund 2013, 2).
One of those information systems, the annual Public Water System Surveys (PWSS), is
not publically published regularly, and PWSS data is volunteered by water utilities but is
not subject to any auditing (Cahill and Lund 2013, 2). The second large-scale
information set is the Urban Water Management Plan (UWMP), which is submitted by
each Californian city every five years and includes more detailed end use information.
Unfortunately, city-level UWMPs are not comprehensively compiled into larger data sets.
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More detailed analysis of these UWMPs represents a productive field of future research
that may perhaps become a centralized government data collection function.
Although information gaps limit the degree of domestic consumption analysis
possible in California, some trends and conclusions are possible. It is possible to estimate
California’s residential water use habits, local water pricing schema, and drought
responses. At the drought’s start, California’s urban residents used slightly more water
than the national average. To provide context, in 2016 the average American used
between 80 and 100 gallons per capita per day (GPCD), about 50 percent of which went
to outdoor use, such as landscaping (United States Geological Survey 2016). 19 percent
(17.8 GPCD) of that average American household water was used in showers, 16 percent
(15.4 GPCD) by faucets, five percent by washing machines (4.4 GPCD), and two percent
(2 GPCD) lost through leaks (DeOreo et. al. 2016, 5). In comparison, the U.S.
Geological Survey estimated in 2010 that Californians used an average of 108 GPCD for
indoor and outdoor domestic use (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2015,
2). However, Californians use more water outdoors, proportionally, than much of the
country. In 2010, nearly 60 percent of residential water in California went to outdoor use
(a category which includes watering landscapes, washing cars, filling pools, etc.), 10
percent to toilets, 8 percent to showers and 6 percent to faucets. In fact, 70 percent of all
urban outdoor water use goes to residential locations (Natural Resources Defense Council
and Pacific Institute 2014, 2). This heavy outdoor use reflects the West’s arid lawngrowing conditions, which in turn amplify the rooted American “aesthetic and
recreational priorities which are deeply ingrained in all lifestyles” fulfilling a
“psychological need for homeowner identity, status, and symbolic social competition”
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(Knuth et. al. 2018, 2). Furthermore, while indoor residential use stays largely constant
through the year, outdoor use spikes in the summer months—translating into an increase
from about 60 GPCD during January in California, to 110 GPCD in August (California
Legislative Analyst's Office 2017).
Leading up to Governor Jerry Brown’s executive order mandating water cuts on April
1st, 2015, utilities had enacted some local-level restrictions, but homeowners were largely
left to respond to water prices, water appliance rebates, and utility or government pleas to
reduce water consumption. Facing such factors, urban Californians in 2015 reduced their
average water use by 13.5 percent relative to benchmark 2013 levels, but in February
2015 users across the state only reduced water consumption by 2.8 percent (State Water
Resources Control Board 2015). Northern California did even better—reducing average
daily use by 20 percent between 2013 and 2015 (Park et. al. 2015b). In comparison,
Southern California saw smaller water reductions. One water district, the Casitas
Municipal Water District, saw a 97 percent increase in per capita daily water use from
2013 to 2015, up to 424 gallons per day per person by April 2015 (Park et. al. 2015b).
The literature has not yet revealed which habits change first, why northern cities seem to
have responded more quickly, or what were the more effective public outreach programs
in the early stages of the drought.
April 1st, 2015 marked the watershed moment in residential and urban drought
response. Governor Brown mandated that the State Water Resources Control Board
achieve a 25 percent reduction in potable urban water use (relative to 2013) by March
2016—the first mandatory urban water restriction in California State history. The Control
Board, in turn, examined the water use habits of various utilities, and assigned individual
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water district targets. The heaviest water users, such as the Sante Fe Irrigation District, at
over 600 gallons per capita per day, were given as high as a 36 percent reduction goal,
while other communities, which had already been using less water per person, were given
as little as an eight percent reduction goal (Park et. al. 2015b). In response to such state
pressure and the threat of the Control Board levying non-compliance fines of up to $500
per day, local water agencies raised water rates and increased enforcement. By July 2015,
local districts issued 15,800 financial penalties for noncompliance—an increase of nearly
80 percent from June (Boxall and Xia 2015). Such localities therefore had the space to
enact their own rules, but the State Water Resources Control Board is the ultimate
enforcement authority in the case of local noncompliance.
The executive order coupled with local policy doubled residential water savings. By
January 2016, the state’s residential water users had reduced water use by 17.2 percent
relative to January 2013. By January 2017, that figure had increased to 20.5 percent—
translating into an average of 58 residential gallons per capita per day (State Water
Resources Control Board 2017e). In March 2017, the State Water Resources Control
Board announced that cumulative statewide savings from June 2015 through January
2017 was 22.5 percent, saving 2.5 million acre-feet of water—enough to serve 12.5
million residents for one year (Office of the Governor of California et. al. 2017, 1).
The Californian water pricing system shaped incentives during the most recent
drought response and influences marginal water use behavior in all conditions—
regardless of whether a drought has been declared. In 2011, prior to the drought, about
half of all Californian water utilities had implemented block rate water pricing
(incremental increases as volume increases), one quarter had implemented allocation70

based rate structures (wherein a utility judges a particular house’s characteristics,
including evapotranspiration and family size, allocates a “water budget,” and charges
more per unit for water exceeding the “water budget”), and one quarter charged a flat rate
regardless of water consumption (Baurenklau, Schwabe, and Dinar 2014, 2). Some
utilities used block or allocation-based tiered pricing as a tool to achieve their water
reduction goals given the 2015 executive order.
However, Proposition 218, a 1996 California ballot initiative meant to protect
consumers from price-gouging to pay for general governmental services, established that
municipalities cannot impose fees that exceed the actual cost of service—with lasting
consequences for water utilities (California Legislative Analyst's Office 1996). In April
2015, a state appellate court cited Proposition 218 in a unanimous ruling that the suburb
of Roseville’s four-tiered water system was unconstitutional. California’s Supreme Court
denied a request to depublish a similar decision regarding the City of San Juan
Capistrano’s tiered system later in 2015 (denying such a request means that the court’s
ruling may be used as precedent in other related cases) (Cuniff 2015). A ballot measure
introduced in December 2015 by the California State Association of Counties, the League
of California Cities, and ACWA to allow local utilities to utilize such tiered pricing was
retracted in December 2016 due to unfavorable polling (Contra Costa County 2016).
While many state water utilities already employ tiered water rates that appear safe from
legal battle, the rulings have likely slowed the implementation of new tiered water
systems—even if they could actually reflect the cost of service. In California, tiered
pricing has been shown to reduce household water usage by ten to 15 percent, and results

71

in proportionally larger reductions for households that consume more water (Baurenklau,
Schwabe, and Dinar 2014, 4).
Although residential reductions approached the Governor’s 25 percent goal during
drought years, many researchers are now anxiously observing which conservation
measures have resulted in lasting changes and public opinion. The spatiallyheterogeneous results show both promising and concerning trends. Some drought
responses, such as lawn removal and appliance updating, theoretically would reduce
water consumption permanently. Public perception research also appears hopeful. In
March 2017, the Public Policy Institute of California’s statewide survey indicated that 88
percent of Californians agree that it either very or somewhat “important for the state to
spend more money on water and flood management infrastructure.” (Public Policy
Institute of California “Californians and their government 2017, 8). However, a few
factors have contributed to a behavioral return to pre-drought habits. Media coverage
decreased after the removal of California’s state of emergency in April 2017, and a warm
2018 winter necessitated more water-intensive lawn-care. Water agencies lifted
restrictions—for example, while Pomona only allowed residents to water their lawns
during one day per week in 2016, the city let residents water their yards for three days per
week in 2017 (Guerin 2016b).
Now in 2018, Californians are back to pre-drought water consumption levels (Rogers
2018b). This behavioral “bounce back” reveals varying responses across the state. San
Francisco managed to continue conserving 12 percent of its water use in January 2017
relative to 2013—and the other nine Bay Area counties maintained a water reduction of
almost 7 percent between January 2017 and 2013 (ibid.). However, Southern California
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has more than returned to pre-drought residential levels. Los Angeles, Riverside, and San
Diego have increased use by 3.8 percent from 2013. Los Angeles represented the worst
“bounce back” of a whopping 15.2 percent relative to 2013 (ibid.). This bounce back in
water use cannot be explained by population growth, since San Francisco actually
experienced a greater population increase than Los Angeles (from 2016 to 2017, San
Francisco grew 1.03 percent, while Los Angeles grew 0.68 percent) (World Population
Review 2017b; World Population Review 2017a).
In addition, the public awareness, psychology, and politicization of the 2012 to 2017
drought is an underdeveloped area of research. One study of national drought perceptions
revealed that 16.4 percent of nationally-representative participants correctly knew they
were in a drought-area, 29 percent correctly knew they were not in a drought-area, but 52
percent incorrectly believed they were not in a drought-area (Knuth et. al. 2018, 4).
Therefore it is quite possible that while many Californians support spending more on
water, members of the public may simply have not been aware of the drought or its
severity. Research into the demographics of more willing residential drought responders
is needed information for governments to decide where to most efficiently spend publicoutreach funds, or where creative outreach programs are necessary to attract less willing
people.
Summary of 2012 to 2017 Drought Responses
A complex range of federal, state, and local actions constituted California’s
multifaceted response to the 2012 - 2017 drought. Federal relief programs provided
hundreds of millions of dollars to affected farmers, emergency drinking water supplies,
and temporary employment. Federal laws, such as the Endangered Species Act, and
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agencies, such as the Bureau of Reclamation, have and will continue to play an important
role in California’s water management decisions. State legislation and agency decisions
provided billions of dollars during the drought to water projects, such as toilet and lawn
rebate programs, implemented new water consumption reporting requirements, and
introduced California’s first comprehensive groundwater management scheme. Finally,
local communities and individual water consumers, who may participate in rebate
programs and change their water habits, dramatically adapted to the drought—although
residential use, in some areas, is returning to pre-drought rates.
While the three broad levels of decision-making, implementing, and enforcement
forces must collaborate in order to produce the most efficient outcomes, the drought
proved that the balance between state and local control is currently shifting, and must
continue to shift, toward increased state and regional oversight in order to best manage
water resources. Local control is an ideal achieved under flexible market conditions, but
the market failures involved in groundwater’s external costs and lack of information
around surface water management (i.e. lack of more complex hydrological data) have
meant that the California State Government assumed new powers during this drought. In
addition to market composition, the State’s intention to give localities the power to craft
Groundwater Sustainability Plans and 25 percent water utility reductions can only work
when there is fair enforcement mechanism in place.
Time will tell if the State Water Resources Control Board is equipped to equitably
and efficiently manage that role. Perhaps more advanced remote monitoring or more
engaged citizens will be necessary, especially in urban settings, to fully enforce local
edicts. Regardless of the mechanism, public trust in this enforcement role will be critical,
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yet the drought did expose socioeconomic rifts. For example, a New York Times article,
titled “In California, Stingy Water Users Are Fined in Drought, While the Rich Soak,”
detailed how one un-fined Bel Air resident used more than 30,000 gallons of water per
day (Lovett 2015). In addition to solidifying its enforcement powers, the State
Government of California might have greatly aided the drought response by increasing
research in collaborative public-policy settings—hopefully decreasing the local
information gap—and looking into ways to continue to make the water market a more
flexible and reliable indicator of water costs. In addition, inter-county working groups or
pacts may have been a fruitful avenue between state and local management.
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Chapter 4: Australia Case Study
In evaluating how future policy could interact with the current legislative
landscape in the face of unknown drought conditions, it is helpful to look at the concrete
effects of another drought-prone region’s mitigation history, policies, and results.
Australia is an apt comparison to California for several economic and hydrologic
reasons. From a socioeconomic perspective, Australia, with its population of 24 million,
and California, with its population of 39 million, are within the same order of magnitude.
Both Australia and California had a per-capita GDP of USD 56,000 in 2015 (The World
Bank 2017). Agriculture is a large revenue source for both political entities: Australia’s
85,000 farms grossed $60 billion from 2016 to 2017, while California’s 75,000 farms
grossed approximately $45 billion (Australia Bureau of Statistics 2017; United States
Department of Agriculture 2018). In Australia, about 1.9 billion acres (roughly one half
of Australia’s total land area) are designated for agricultural production, of which
750,000,000 acres are for cattle grazing (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). In
California, too, around 43 million acres (about one half of the state’s total land area) are
devoted to agriculture, about 16 million acres of which are for grazing (2015-2016
CDFA). This demand is manifested in both region’s water use patterns, so that of
Australia’s consumptive water uses—which excludes “in-stream” uses which return
water to the environment—65 percent, or 9,882,500 acre-feet, goes to agriculture
(Kendall 2013, 4). Between one third and one half of Australia’s water comes from
groundwater sources (Harrington and Cook 2014, 11). In California, about 80 percent of
non-environmental water, or 31 million-acre-feet, goes to agriculture, and about 76
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percent of average annual groundwater extraction is used for agriculture (Public Policy
Institute of California 2016; Cooley 2015, 5).
In addition to comparable economic size and agricultural presence, both regions
experience similar current climates and will face similar climatic trends. New South
Wales, Australia’s most populous state, gets an average of 20 inches of rainfall per year,
with a standard deviation of 6.4 inches (Australia Bureau of Meteorology, 2010).
California gets an average of 22 inches, with a standard deviation of 6.4 inches (National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2010). Both Australia and California also
experience large yearly and decadal weather swings—New South Wales therefore has a
variation coefficient of 3.5, while California’s variation coefficient of 4.5 is slightly
larger (Cahill and Lund 2013, 1-2).
Just as in California, Australia’s rainfall is extremely temporally and spatially
variable. The Hunter River’s maximum to minimum annual flow ratio is about 54 (for
comparison, the Tuolumne River’s ratio is about 8), and Australian streams have an
annual variability roughly double the average throughout the rest of the world
(Zimmerman et. al. 2017; Kendall 2013, 2). Geographically, the northern costs of
Western Australia, Northern Territory, and Queensland receive the majority of the
country’s annual runoff. The southern and eastern parts of the country, on the other hand,
which include metropolitan centers such as Sydney and contain about 70 percent of the
country’s irrigated agricultural land, receive less than 25 percent of the country’s annual
runoff (Kendall 2013, 2). California and Australia have both dealt with such variability
with reservoir systems and water conveyance. In addition to spatial and temporal
variation, the country is simply dry. Australia’s precipitation is less than a quarter of any
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other continent—making it “the driest inhabited continent in the world” (Kendall 2013,
1).
Australia’s political system is similar to, although somewhat different from,
California and the United States—having been called a “Washminster” mix of both
Washington, D.C.’s and Westminster’s systems (Thompson 1980). Australia is both a
constitutional monarchy, with the Queen of Australia, Queen Elizabeth II, at its head, and
a representative democracy, with a Constitution enshrining three branches of
government: executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive branch, according to the
Constitution, is comprised of the Executive Council, headed by the Queen’s
representative, the Governor-General, who is appointed by the Queen on the advice of the
Prime Minister, and various bureaucratic Departments. In practice, however, most of the
executive decision-making approved by the Federal Executive Council actually comes
from the Cabinet, in which the Governor-General, on the advice of the Prime Minister,
appoints various Ministers. The Constitution does not recognize the Cabinet—it exists
only by convention (Australia Government 2017). The legislative branch is comprised of
the bicameral Parliament, containing both a 76-member and 150-member House of
Representatives. Each of the six states is represented by 12 senators, while each of the
two territories is represented by two senators each. The Constitution enshrines a federalist
system, wherein the states are accorded certain powers—although the federal government
may override the territories’ laws. Next, each state, in its own Constitution and laws,
delegates local governments with certain roles and functions (ibid.).
With this governmental framework, Australia, like California, has a long political
and economic history of addressing drought. The 1895-1902 Federation Drought,
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considered the country’s “greatest natural disaster,” coincided with the drafting of
Australia’s Constitution (Kendall 2013, 4). During the 1897 to 1989 Australian Federal
Convention, a major area of debate was deciding between competing irrigation, livestock,
urban, and riverboat interests around the River Murphy—the country’s largest river.
Upper states fought any restriction on their water use, while downstream states wanted
protection for their irrigation and river navigation. Ultimately, the Constitution boiled
down this debate into Clause 100: “The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or
regulation of trade or commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to
the reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation” (Kendall 2013,
5).
While this is quite similar to the reasonable use doctrine eventually adopted by
California to evaluate water disputes, the difference between Australia’s and California’s
water rights deserves some attention. Australia does not have competing water right
schemes analogous to California’s schism between riparian and appropriative rights.
Instead, Australia began to transform its riparian rights into statutory water rights in
1886. In the 1900s, Australia’s states awarded free statutory water rights—usually for one
acre-foot—in order to increase agricultural productivity in the drier interior of the
continent. Eventually an over-allocation of water rights prompted the establishment of
water markets in various states through the 1980s (Grafton et. al. 2010, 7). The Council
of Australian Governments finalized this split in 1994 between statutory surface water
rights and land rights—yet state discrepancies in water use conditions have limited interstate trade (ibid.). Australia’s water rights system has therefore shown great change
historically from riparian, to state-gifted, to tradeable statutory rights.
79

In addition to a system of statutory water rights, the country’s water management
has been characterized by interregional projects. In 1915, after more than a decade of
deliberation eventually punctuated with a drought in 1914, four states signed the River
Murray Waters Agreement, which allocated shares of the river’s water and ordered the
construction of large storage areas and 35 weirs (Kendall 2013, 6). The River Murray
Commission, created in 1917, was then tasked with implementing the Agreement, now
hailed as a “pioneering document ahead of its time” (ibid.). Over the next 70 years, the
Commission’s role eventually increased to include water quality, and yet the Commission
never fully adapted to environmental issues such as salinity and land degradation. By
1985, what started as a meeting of the land, water, and environmental ministers of the
involved states and Australian Commonwealth eventually produced, two years later, the
Murray-Darling Basin Agreement “to promote and co-ordinate effective planning and
management for the equitable, efficient and sustainable use of the land, water and other
environmental resources of the Murray-Darling Basin” (Kendall 2013, 7). In July 1997,
more environmental and water quality concerns forced the four Murray-Darling states
and the federal government to sign an agreement to permanently cap the river’s
diversions to 1993/1994 levels, which, although it has not stemmed other sources of river
impacts such as groundwater pumping or plantation forestry, the cap has proven largely
successful in preventing new diversions (Kendall 2013, 9).
A last major piece of Australia’s governmental water policy framework, for the
purposes of understanding the country’s drought response, is drought legislation itself. In
1971, the country began to categorize drought as a natural disaster, providing relief
during a drought to citizens via the joint Commonwealth-state Natural Disaster Relief and
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Recover Arrangements (Australian Department of Agriculture and Water Resources
2015). However, by 1989, Australia declared that review of this policy was necessary,
which eventually “determined that previous drought policy was poorly targeted, distorted
farm input prices and worked as a disincentive for farmers to prepare for drought” (ibid.).
The resulting 1992 National Drought Policy aimed to “encourage primary producers and
other sections of rural Australia to adopt self-reliant approaches to managing for climate
variability,” as well as to “facilitate the maintenance and protection of Australia’s
agricultural and environmental resources base during periods of climatic stress” (ibid.).
In 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) further drew attention to
drought policy as a major issue of policy concern, and agreed to begin implementing
strategies “to achieve an efficient and sustainable water industry,” synthesizing the
previously intra-state markets (Kendall 2013, 9). However, those broad policy objectives
were not fully explored until a period of protracted drought.
This regulatory background set the stage for Australia’s “Millennium” drought,
which ravaged the country from 1996 to about 2010. With such historical context, it is
possible to understand the conditions which produced Australia’s drought response, and
compare what methods (including both policy and the source of policy) may improve
California’s drought resiliency.
The drought itself was hydrologically extreme and economically expensive. After
a few years of reduced rainfall throughout much of Southern Australia and Queensland
(and a longer-term decline in water availability since the 1970s in southwestern
Australia), precipitation greatly declined after a 2002 El Niño event (Kendall 2013, 10).
Unlike previous El Niño events, the 2002 event was not followed with wet years
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replenishing water supplies—instead, dry conditions ensued, reflected in “very low”
water levels contained in eastern Australia’s dams throughout the early 2000s (ibid.). Dry
conditions then met another El Niño event in 2006. This most severe segment of the
drought lasted from 2003-2009, although some trace the drought to 2012 (ibid.). While
this period is not responsible for the lowest recorded water inflows (although only a few
instances since 1880 surpass those levels), the Millennium Drought is unique in the scale
of the human reliance on water, and the subsequent toll on Australians (Kendall 2013,
11).
Australia’s water storage system, like California’s extensive network of canals
and dams, did mitigate some of the drought’s affects. Although the drought was most
severe in southeastern Australia—the home of many urban centers—many southern
Australian rivers are dammed and regulated in order to ensure reliable urban and
domestic supply. At maximum storage capacity after ample rainfall, Australia may store
enough water to last up to seven years (Kendall 2013, 2-3). Such storage is intended to
mitigate the temporal variation in water resources, while conveyance systems can
overcome spatial variations in rainfall.
Despite this water infrastructure, the drought’s impacts required action. In 2004,
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) called a meeting to continue the 1994
water initiative, where it finalized the National Water Initiative (NWI). Under this
intergovernmental agreement, Australia’s state governments must prepare water plans,
identity stressed water systems and move to achieve sustainable water use, “introduce
registers of water rights and standards for water accounting” in order to expand water
trading, “improve pricing for water storage and delivery,” and “better manage urban
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water demands” (Australian Department of Agriculture and Water Resources 2017).
Ultimately, it is the “blueprint for water reform across Australia” (Murray-Darling Basin
Authority 2011, 2). The state also created the National Water Commission to drive NWIled national water reform by monitoring, auditing, and generally overseeing the
Initiative’s implementation (Australian Department of Agriculture and Water Resources
2017). In addition, the National Water Commission was tasked with providing evidencebased information to the Council of Australian Governments and the Australian
Government. This framework for ensuring better state monitoring, transparency, and
sustainability is still in place; although in 2014, the National Water Commission was
replaced in name by the Productivity Commission, which now oversees the triennial NWI
assessments.
After the 2004 National Water Initiative gave states the impetus to make water
sustainability a priority and created a central enforcement agency, the federal government
continued to act. In 2006, Prime Minister John Howard called for a Water Summit to
consider other drought responses. This Summit catalyzed the 2007 National Plan for
Water Security—a AUD 10 billion spending program to invest AUD 5 billion in water
efficiency devices and techniques, AUD 3 billion for water-entitlement buybacks (both to
be spent over the course of ten years), and a ten-point plan to generally improve
Australia’s water efficiency and over-allocation (Kendall 2013, 13). Originally, the plan
was also designed to give full management power of the Murray-Darling Basin to the
Commonwealth. While New South Wales, South Australia, and Queensland agreed, the
state of Victoria, lobbied by its Farmers’ Federation, refused.
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After much negotiation, the final piece of legislation, called the Commonwealth
Water Act of 2007, maintained the AUD 10 billion investment but did not contain the
originally intended federal takeover of Murray-Darling Basin management. Nevertheless,
the Water Act’s main goal is to coordinate a sustainable national water management
response in order to implement the 2004 National Water Initiative. Structural political
reforms to increase this water management efficiency included creating the MurrayDarling Basin Authority—a new government agency—and a Commonwealth
Environmental Water Holder. According to the Water Act, the Murray-Darling Basin
Authority is tasked with creating a Basin Plan to “use and manag[e…] the Basin water
resources in a way that optimises economic, social and environmental outcomes”
(Australian Federal Register of Legislation 2007). To accomplish this goal, the Authority
is tasked with establishing and enforcing sustainable long-term average diversion limits
(accounting for groundwater), and developing a Basin-wide water trading regime.
Collaboration between the various levels of government is still encouraged: Basin States
will complement the Authority’s Plan by preparing water resource plans submitted to the
Environment Minister. Yet centralizing more of the decision-making process about the
basin to the federal level, in order to “to manage the [Basin] as a whole, in the national
interest,” is still “a central aim of the Act” (Skinner and Langford 2013, 9). Enforcement
of this Basin Plan lies with the National Water Commission, whose other tasks include
implementing the National Water Initiative of 2004.
In addition to prompting a larger federal oversight and decision-making role in the
Murray-Darling Basin, the Water Act of 2007 increased and reorganized the federal role
in other areas. The Water Act created the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder—
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a new government agency whose main goal is to “manage the Commonwealth’s
environmental water to protect and restore the environmental assets of the MurrayDarling Basin, and outside the Basin where the Commonwealth owns water” (Kendall
2013, 14). The Water Act also gave the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission a new “key role in developing and enforcing water charge and water market
rules along the lines agreed in the National Water Initiative” (ibid.). The ACCC was not
the only entity to receive new responsibilities; the Water Act also gave the Bureau of
Meteorology the country’s main role in assessing and providing water information. Now,
the Bureau monitors and forecasts the country’s water resources, and has built the
Australian Water Resources Information System (AWRIS) in order to transparently share
that information with citizens.2
Finally, the Water Act developed a new project to provide a huge boost of
funding and research on sustainable water management. This project, called “Water for
the Future,” originally gave the Australian Department of Sustainability, Environment,
Water, Population and Communities (in 2015, responsibility for water policy was
transferred to the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources) nearly AUD 13
billion in total over ten years in order to increase water security, which, according to one
scholar, provides “unprecedented attention to water, coupled with unprecedented
budgets" (Kendall 2013, 15). The Department is using the money for a variety of
initiatives, including the Urban Water and Desalination Program (encouraging cities to be
less reliant on rainfall and instead engage in more storm water harvesting, water

2

An example of the Bureau of Meteorology’s interactive maps and data may be found
here: http://www.bom.gov.au/water/dashboards/#/water-storages/summary/state
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recycling, desalination, etc.), the National Rainwater and Greywater Initiative (providing
funding for households to install rainwater capture tanks or greywater systems), water
infrastructure construction and repair, irrigation projects, and buying water from willing
sellers to rebalance environmental needs.
These various initiatives, from increasing the quality and quantity of water
resources information, to implementing a water trading market, all helped Australia adapt
to its Millennium Drought. While mentioned somewhat briefly above, a few of the more
successful aspects of Australia’s drought mitigation techniques warrant further scrutiny
as potential lessons for California to respond more effectively to drought and reduce
drought-incurred costs. These topics, programs, costs, and benefits are explored further
below.

Lessons learned from Australia
1. Information Gathering
The basis of realistic decision-making is information. This is true for any government
action as well as private choice. Australia enhanced its Millennium Drought response and
future drought resiliency by investing in and creating various monitoring and data storage
systems. To achieve this goal, there is first the issue of collecting the data itself. The main
water information collection entities in Australia are the Bureau of Statistics, Bureau of
Meteorology, and the individual state governments. Australia has detailed required
reporting standards, which allow for rich water databases. However, this is an ongoing
investment venture—and Australia is piloting various smart water meter technologies.
Examples are the Bundaberg Regional Council in Queensland, Australia, which will
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invest more than AUD 1 million in smart meters; and the WaterGroup company’s launch
of Australia’s first NarrowBand Internet of Things (IoT) ultrasonic water meter (with
great potential to easily install and connect devices in order to detect leaks and other data)
(Arad Group; Volkwyn 2017).
Secondly, the data must be synthesized and accessible. The Bureau of Meteorology,
in its own words, “provides a suite of nationally consistent groundwater data and
information products” including groundwater data visualization, a comprehensive chart
of water allocation trade prices and quantities, and even water storage maps that can be
filtered by storage system type (Australian Bureau of Meteorology 2018a; Australian
Bureau of Meteorology 2018b). The Australian Bureau of Statistics, for its part,
consistently collects data from surveys, water utilities, and research papers, in order to
publish a national “Water Account” every three years, complete with national summary
statistics and specific urban water uses (Cahill and Lund 2013, 2). Additionally, the
Bureau of Meteorology, State and Territory governments, and the Water Services
Association of Australia, in compliance with the National Water Initiative of 2004,
independently and publicly report on the pricing and quality of water service provided
each year. The Bureau’s report is called the “Urban National Performance Report”
(Australian Bureau of Meteorology 2018c). These databases and reports help summarize
the information gleaned from investments in water metering technologies, water use
reporting requirements, and cooperation across sectors.
Standardized, ample data provide the tools for decision-makers to assess which wateruse areas or industry sectors are less sustainable, and then to examine the effects of
implemented policy. In addition, such information helps individual citizens learn about
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sustainable water use and potentially change their consumptive habits in response to
fuller information. Therefore, the various ways that Australia centralized and
standardized water data’s collection, storage, and dissemination is an important lesson.
2. Water Markets
Large quantities of high-quality data are necessary not only for general decisionmaking, but are critical to implement one of Australia’s most unique water management
features successfully: its water clearing house. Beginning with limited water trading in
the state of Victoria in the 1980s, the National Water Initiative of 2004 marked the
adoption of a national water-reform package expanding the water market among all states
in the Murray Darling Basin. Since the Basin produces about 40 percent of the country’s
agricultural output, and because farmers often are the first to face the costs of drought, a
2012 water management plan helped recognize and incorporate the older allocated water
rights of farmers (Packham 2015). However, a point of contention has been just how
much water the government may buy, since such competition raises the prices and limits
other farms’ ability to purchase water in drought conditions. In fact, Australian
lawmakers voted in 2015 to halve the amount of water that the federal government may
buy from farmers (ibid.).
Despite these obstacles, the water market offers a tantalizing method of ensuring that
water goes towards its most productive use under shifting conditions. The Department of
Agriculture and Water Resources, which helps oversee the market (alongside the main
enforcement agent, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) boasts that
“our water markets are internationally recognised as Australia’s water reform success
story.” The market has grown so considerably that it currently has an annual turnover
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between AUD 1 and 3 billion dollars, and generates economic benefits valued in the
hundreds of millions of dollars. Since 2008, Australia’s water markets have resulted in
217,000 water trades, and, also since 2008, the northern Basin region has seen a 30 per
cent growth per year of its traded volume (Australian Department of Agriculture and
Water Resources 2016; Australian Department of Agriculture and Water Resources
2018). Not only is the market now fairly broad, but it is also flexible. Citizens with water
access entitlements may either temporarily or permanently sell their allocations, and
regulating agencies have in place maximum processing-time standards. And, of course,
because a water-right holder may instantly access market price information via either the
Bureau of Meteorology or the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources, irrigators
and other water users may quickly weight costs, benefits, and market trends in order to
best allocate resources. This market transparency and flexibility is especially important
when water resources are scarce. However, in order for the market to help maximize the
benefits of water, the prices must accurately reflect the various costs of transporting the
water, diverting it from environmental use, and other potential externalities.
3. Agricultural Efficiency via Crop Selection and Drought Relief Strategies
Because the largest single-sector water user in Australia, like in California, is
agriculture, investing in agricultural adaptations has been crucial to keep Australian
agriculture competitive and resilient during water shortages. Australia provides a few
lessons about the potential ways to implement such strategies, although the unique
characteristics of certain crops would influence the scalability of these examples.
From 1971 to 1989, Australia treated drought as a natural disaster, and as such the
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements offered various support programs for
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affected farmers. This is similar to the various United States federal relief programs
mentioned above during California’s drought.
In 1989, the Australian federal government changed this policy so that, rather than
distorting drought costs, incentives would encourage farmers to prepare for drought and
maintain long-term sustainable levels of production (Australian Department of
Agriculture and Water Resources 2015). This new framework, called the 1992 National
Drought Policy, was “based on principles of self-reliance, risk management and an
understanding that drought is an inherent feature of the Australian environment” (Kiem
2013). In a simplification of its various programs, the National Drought Policy aims to
guide farmers into self-reliant practices by providing rebates for drought insurance advice
and assessments, yet during severely dry times the Drought Assistance Concessional
Loans program can provide up to AUD 1 million under certain terms and only to farms
that have submitted “an acceptable” Drought Management Plan (Australian Department
of Agriculture and Water Resources 2018b).
The National Drought Policy, which is still the backbone of Australia’s droughtrelated agricultural response, has experienced many changes, amendments, and periodic
reviews over the past 26 years that help keep the Policy efficient and innovative. A
mosaic of programs, such as FarmHelp, FarmBis, and an Exit Grant of up to AUD
150,000 for farmers selling their enterprises, have come into and out of existence. For
example, until 2014, farmers could apply for a declaration of Exceptional Circumstances,
and—if granted—the farmers could then apply for an Exceptional Circumstances Interest
Rate Subsidy (available for farms that were viable in the long term but experiencing
difficulties due to the Exceptional Circumstance). However, the Exceptional
90

Circumstances declaration was divisive in creating some feelings of resentment among
farmers, and relied on hydrologic triggers which, according to a government review, were
“not appropriate under a changing climate”—as evidenced by the fact that some
Australian regions experienced this “Exceptional Circumstance” for over 13 years
between 1992 and 2010 (Nicholson et. al. 2011, 11). The Australian government’s
ability to review the program’s criteria and effects transparently eventually led the
government to not only address changing inputs, but also produce results more consistent
with the program’s stated aim.
In addition to this flexible but powerful policy framework, Australia has been
innovating different agricultural adaptations ranging from genetic selection to farming
techniques to respond to the Millennium Drought and prepare for a hotter future. At
current global emissions levels, Australia’s temperature is estimated to increase by two
degrees Fahrenheit between 2010 and 2030, and the number of days above 95 degrees
Fahrenheit could double by 2070 (Parliament of Australia 2009; Patterson 2015). For
context, Australia’s climate warmed by about two degrees Fahrenheit between 1910 and
2017 (Australian Bureau of Meteorology 2018d). Warmer, drier conditions will be
particularly negative for certain Australian-grown crops, such as walnuts, peaches, and
chickpeas.
In the face of these temperature trends, many Australian farmers are looking to shift
to drought- and heat-tolerant crops, such as sweet potatoes (Patterson 2015). Farmers are
also investigating ways to make crops and cattle more drought- and heat-tolerant
(Kingwell 2006). For example, even though rainfall has decreased by about 7 inches per
year since 1970 in Western Australia’s gain belt, wheat production has ultimately
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increased due to the utilization of different species with shorter growing seasons,
increasing farming acreage, dry sowing seeds, conservation tillage, and other water
efficiency strategies (Davis 2017; Patterson 2015). Agricultural demand is also leading to
research evaluating different cattle breeds that are less susceptible to heat stroke and
death in hotter climates (Kingwell 2006, 6). Finally, the drought has reinforced the notion
that diversification—both in terms of crop portfolio, i.e. types of crops grown, and spatial
diversification, i.e. taking advantage of different growing conditions (an adaptation
technique which is less feasible for smaller farms) —increases resiliency.
Australia’s federal and state governments have been helping encourage this
adaptation for decades, but current proactive rebates and policies keep drought mitigation
a consistent way of life rather than a “one-time” response that actually recurs with each
drought. Recognizing farmers’ water-dependence and drought-vulnerability, federal,
state, and local water management plans to address how to mitigate agricultural impacts,
balance social, economic, and environmental needs, and provide farmers the information
and financial aid necessary to judge the changing risks, costs, and effects of drought
accurately.
4. Urban Adaptation
Finally, in addition to the impact that increasing the quality and quantity of water
related information; transparent and efficient water markets; and innovative, forwardthinking, evidence-based agricultural adaptations; Australia’s domestic and urban
response to the Millennial Droughts offers perhaps the starkest comparison with
California and the most hopeful lesson. Due to the increasing urbanization of both
regions, urban water consumption will prove increasingly important to reduce water
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demand in times of water stress. Australia led an aggressive government campaign not
only to respond quickly to the Millennium drought, but also to install efficient
technologies, increase public awareness, and permanently change water habits. Unlike
California, Australia has managed to reduce household per capita consumption
successfully, which has proven to be a low-cost way to reduce water use significantly.
Australia reduced domestic consumption during and after the Millennium Drought by
addressing a variety of water uses, employing extensive publicity, and offering various
financial incentives for individuals and businesses. For example, in 2009, the federal
government offered rebates of up to AUD 1,500 to install household rainwater capture
systems. Because the government publicized this offer so effectively, 32 percent of all
eligible homes installed rainwater capture systems (Rogers 2018b). In comparison, Los
Angeles’ highly touted maximum of $2,000-per-lawn-removal rebate ($350 million
statewide) had reached, by 2016, only 2,600 Los Angeles households (Goldenstein 2015).
There are no comprehensive studies about the full impact or cost-effectiveness of the
project in Los Angeles or the state at-large. In addition to increasing the water supply
and self-reliance of Australian households, other water projects addressed domestic
demand. The state distributed free water-saving equipment—for example, out a total of
1.3 million Melbourne households, within four years more than 460,000 showerheads
were replaced at no owner cost (Rowley 2016).
Importantly, Australian governments placed a premium on providing information to
individuals and utilities. On the Bureau of Meteorology’s homepage, it is possible to
easily access a daily-updated percentage (to the nearest tenth of a percentage point) of
how much water is each state’s reservoir system (Australian Bureau of Meteorology
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2018b). Municipalities paid for newspaper and even billboard advertisements describing
various personal water-saving methods, such as shorter showers, efficient showerheads,
and other adaptations.
In addition to these federal programs, state and local programs targeted domestic
consumption. Between 2005 and 2017, the Australian federal government invested more
than AUD 2.4 billion to help Australian municipalities improve their water security—in
addition to the AUD 10 billion spent within federally-run programs and the money spent
by the states and cities themselves (Kendall 2013, 15; Australian Department of
Agriculture and Water Resources 2018c). For example, the state of Victoria ordered its
three water utilities—all state-owned—to cooperate in formulating comprehensive
responses, and provided the funds for various projects (Rowley 2016). The State of
Victoria also, in 2004, commenced its “Our Water Our Future” plan, which is a program
containing 110 actions for sustainable water management over the next 50 years, offers
funds for a variety of projects, including modernizing irrigation systems within its “food
bowl,” a new desalination plant in Melbourne, and publicity campaigns to conserve water
(ibid.).
This Australian federal, state, and city money—in addition to the variety and
publicity of programs available—produced significant and long-standing domestic water
consumption reductions. Australia reduced residential gallons per capita day use from an
average of 83 GPCD in 2000, to 54 in 2009 (Cahill and Lund 2013, 2). Melbourne is the
most water efficient out of all of Australia’s urban centers—its residents used an average
of 40 GPCD in 2010 (ibid.).
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The largest differences between Australian and Californian residential water
consumption habits, and a potential area for California to further address in the future, is
outdoor water use. In fact, according to government statistics, over half of the difference
in Australian and Californian residential consumption is due to outdoor water use alone
(ibid.). For context, in Australia, residents use between five and 55 GPCD on outdoor
uses, depending on the city; in California, residents use between 30 and 100 GPCD on
outdoor uses. This points to the effects of cultural differences in lawn values, water prices
themselves, and other outdoor water restrictions. Permanent restrictions on outdoor use in
Australia exist across many municipalities: for example, in Melbourne, it is prohibited to
use water outdoors between 10:00am and 8:00pm, and if neighbors notice residents
wasting water, they can call a hotline to investigate and possible impose a maximum
AUD 458 fine (Cahill and Lund 2013, 6). Additionally, Australians pay more for
residential water, on average, than Californian households, despite buying less water
(Cahill and Lund 2013, 3). These price-based and policy-based factors show how water
consumption in comparably dry, drought-prone regions, where average household lots are
of a similar size (Australia’s 8,000 square-feet average lot versus California’s 9,000
square-feet), can be so different. However, it is also clear that it is more difficult to
reduce outdoor water use than to maintain low levels of use.
The next largest difference between California and Australia’s residential
consumption—and an example of shifting water habits in Australia—is toilet use. Until
2000, toilets were Australia’s largest indoor residential end-use. In 1981, an Australian
toilet manufacturer introduced a dual flush toilet with 3 and 1.5 gallons per flush options
to replace the hitherto prevalent 3.5 or 6 gallons per flush toilets. By 1984, Victoria
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required these dual flush options in all new construction—a requirement soon followed
by all other states. By 2001, 64 percent of Australian households had dual-flush toilets.
By 2010, 86 percent of households had such toilets (Cahill and Lund 2013, 6). New
Australian dual flush toilets can use as little as 0.8 and 1.6 gallons for a half and full
flush, respectively. The United States, in comparison, began to require low flow toilets
(two gallons per flush) in 1992. However, by 2000, only 26 percent of Californian
household had such low flow toilets (Cahill and Lund 2013, 7). Australia’s strong rebate
programs and simply a greater amount of time since law passage are likely key factors to
the country’s large extent and penetration of water habit changes.
These residential water savings, from outdoor to indoor water use, will be
increasingly important as the risk of hotter temperatures, drier years, and the risk of
drought increase. Melbourne Water, the city’s water management agency, estimated that
had the city not reduced domestic water consumption in response to the Millennium
Drought, Melbourne would have completely depleted its water reserves by 2009. Instead,
the city was able to survive the Millennium Drought for another year before rainfall
replenished its reservoirs.
To summarize these Australian drought adaptations, the country legislated
requirements for and invested improvements in reliable water information. The country
has synthesized easily-digestible information into central locations. This information
provides the groundwork for evidence-based individual and government decisionmaking. California, meanwhile, has no such accessible water information database.
Australia’s water information continues to be necessary for the implementation of its
central water clearinghouse, which, in theory, ensures that market forces encourage water
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to go towards its most productive uses. However, there are concerns for allocating and
buying non-market services, such as environmental needs, and for the ability of small
water users to compete in such a market. Additionally, Australia has attempted to balance
these various water uses with the survival and adaptation of its agricultural sector which,
as in California, consumes a majority of total annual water. The country has invested in
heat- and drought- tolerant species, farmers have shifted to various water efficient
growing techniques, and Australia attempts to ensure that farmer-facing water prices
accurately reflect the costs and benefits of that water. In comparison, the United States
government subsidizes the cost of water provided for Californian farmers through the
Central Valley Project by perhaps $60 million annually (Hanak et. al. 2011, 93). Finally,
Australians use considerably less than Californians for residential uses. Publicity around
drought conditions and water saving techniques, in addition to rebate programs, have
translated into widespread adoption of water-saving technologies throughout Australia.
These measures will be increasingly important to achieve long-term water security for a
large proportion of Australia’s citizens.
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Chapter 5: A Discussion of Policy Suggestions for California’s
Drought Response
Considering the 2012 - 2017 California drought’s various costs, projected droughtrelated trends, and lessons from a similar climatic region, it is clear that there are some
key ways in which California can maximize its resiliency, flexibility, and
competitiveness—and, importantly, reduce the most severe impacts on Californian jobs
and lives. The recent drought’s $9 billion economic cost (likely underestimating
ecological effects and various miscellaneous yet effected sectors, such as recreational
sports) highlights the state’s current political inadequacies and economic vulnerabilities.
Given the concerning estimates of decreased snowfall, increased drought risk—with
“dry” and “critical” years estimated to increase from 32 percent of the historical average
to between 50 to 64 percent—in addition to increased extreme heat conditions, it is
irresponsible to ignore the host of water risks facing California. California therefore faces
the choice of either paying the cost of inaction or preparing for a more drought-prone
future.
The evidence as explored in this thesis strongly indicates that methods, ranging from
little-to-no-cost policy, to larger investment projects, would all help prepare California
for its next drought. These projects can aim to either increase the water supply, decrease
water demand, strengthen other drought prerogatives, or more fundamentally shift the
power of decision-making in order to optimize water management. In considering these
policy suggestions, it is important to question the pathway for enactment, program costs,
ease of implementation, and political salience with its target population.
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First, California should examine a few ways in which it may increase the supply
of water. Investing in desalination and water recycling plants is currently an expensive
yet long-term solution to significantly increase water supply, which nonetheless holds
great promise. Facing similar climatic trends and coastal water demand functions,
Australia has invested more than AUD 10 billion since 2006 to build six desalination
plants capable of producing nearly 500,000 acre-feet of water per year. From 2012-2013,
the entire city of Perth received 29 percent of its total urban water from desalination
plants (Australian Water Association 2018). Desalination therefore holds great promise in
permanently securing the water supply of coastal communities, but further innovative
research is needed. For example, since about half of desalination’s operating costs
actually come from energy use, harnessing California’s increasing wind and solar
production may be necessary to reduce costs and greenhouse emissions. The federal or
state government should seriously weigh the costs of building desalination plants with the
ability of desalination to “free up” more state water to go towards inland or agricultural
uses. In addition, although water recycling currently comprises about one percent of the
state’s total water supply, future technological advancements may quickly make it a
viable, cost-effective method of further increasing water’s lifespan (Badiuzzaman,
McLaughlin, and McCauley 2017). Some municipalities, such as the city of Santa Rosa
and the Chino Basin Water District cities, already recycle a majority of their wastewater
(Natural Resources Defense Council and the Pacific Institute 2014b). In March 2018,
after a two-year period of public and expert review, the State Water Resources Control
Board adopted foundational water quality standards for local recycling plants—paving
the way for future adoption (State Water Resources Control Board 2018). And the Pacific
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Institute estimates that water reuse may increase the water supply by around 1.5 million
acre-feet per year (Natural Resources Defense Council and the Pacific Institute 2014b).
In addition to desalination and water recycling, California can invest in a range of
supply-increasing mechanisms, such as optimizing reservoir management and reducing
water leakages throughout the water conveyance system. A report by the California
Department of Water Resources estimates that the average public utility loses ten percent
of its water to leakage—offering a potential water savings of 840,000 acre-feet every year
with the help of smarter water metering technologies and acoustic leak detection
(California Department of Water Resources 2015e). Reservoir management, too, can help
maximize water retention. All four of Los Angeles’ reservoirs have been covered either
with “shade balls”—millions of four-inch plastic balls—or floating covers, both of which
aim to limit algal growth and decrease evaporation by 85 to 90 percent. That translates
into saving 300 million gallons of water, or 920 acre-feet (Howard 2015). Increasing
groundwater use has historically been an important way for many Californians to
maintain water supply in times of drought, yet the various costs of groundwater
withdrawal, irreversible aquifer damage, subsidence effects, and other externalities
mentioned in Chapter 1 indicate that local and state government should carefully weigh
the long-term sustainability, environmental, economic, and social costs of these supplyside devices in order to invest in the most promising, socially cost-effective programs.
While increasing the water supply in California may carry a greater public
fascination, decreasing water demand can reconfigure the very needs which create
economic and social susceptibilities to drought. California can aim to decrease particular
sectors of water demand in order to maximize water resilience and take advantage of
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projected demographic and climatic trends. These demand-side focuses appear most
promising and impactful in the realms of agricultural efficiency, urban water education,
increasing water markets, and permanent policy and culture shifts in drought acceptance.
Since agriculture is not only the largest single water use sector in California (25
million acre-feet per year), but also, in the 2012 - 2017 drought, the most quickly and
severely impacted by drought, California should act to make the agricultural sector more
sustainable and water secure. To do so, a range and combination of methods can prepare
for an uncertain future, such as researching agricultural technologies, promoting the dual
goals of reducing irrigated land and maximizing the efficiency of irrigated land, and
allowing market conditions to transmit accurate cost and benefit values to the Californian
farmer.
As snowpack levels, which have helped decrease the temporal variation in annual
water supplies, decrease quite substantially over the next few decades, California’s water
function will even more closely resemble the climate and hydrology of Australia—
another large world agricultural producer. Despite enduring its own extreme drought,
Australia has kept its agriculture competitive by investing in agricultural research,
involving agricultural representatives in most water-related decision-making councils,
facilitating market conditions with a centralized water clearing house, and minimizing
inefficient and distorting emergency aid.
Looking to these examples and examining its own risk factors, California can and
should be at the cutting-edge of research around dry farming techniques. This can come
in the form of public-private partnerships, funding prototype programs and sprinklerremoval rebates in key agricultural areas. The fact that over 500,000 acres—which is 6.5
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percent of the total Californian cropland and 50 percent more than in non-drought
years—was left to fallow points to a lack of adaptability. Australia has proven that
implementing effective dry farming techniques can maintain production of certain crops,
incomes, and jobs, even in drier conditions. Rather than fallowing land previously used
for low-yield crops, such as alfalfa, it is possible to proactively reduce agricultural water
use and prepare Californian farms for the next drought.
Yet where irrigation is either cost-effective or already in place, California can take
other steps to ensure that irrigated water is used more efficiently. Currently, 10 million
acres of farmland in California are irrigated. Of that total, 1.7 million acres employ
sprinkler irrigation, 2.9 million utilize micro-irrigation, and 5.6 million rely on surfaceirrigation (a term used for flooding lands) (Maupin et. al. 2014, 32). However, throughout
the Western States between 2005 and 2010, the use of surface-irrigation methods
decreased by about 500 thousand acres, while the number of acres using sprinkler and
micro-irrigation increased by about one million acres (Maupin et. al. 2014, 31). Microirrigation has an estimated system efficiency range of 80-95 percent, while landscape
spray systems only has an efficiency range of 40 to 65 percent (Baum-Haley 2014).
California can help quicken the adoption of efficient irrigation technologies with rebates,
installation programs, or other assistance to farmers. Since these methods can help save
between 0.5 to 3 million acre-feet per year at relatively small additional cost, this is an
area of water management which will likely see strong growth (Burt el. al. 2014, 4). It is
simply a question of how quickly, who will pay, and how much can these methods
mitigate the costs of drought. Instead of keeping the agricultural sector vulnerable to
economic costs ranging in the billions of dollars during times of drought, state and local
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governments can invest proactively in strategies to ensure longer-term water security,
protect jobs, and maintain the important economic function that agriculture plays.
Although investing in such irrigation and dry farming methods is an evidence-based
way to reduce water evaporation loss, minimize wasteful use, and prepare for a drier
future, the California state government can also do much more to facilitate a water
market which will more organically incentivize drought preparation by facing farmers
with true water costs.
California’s water market is currently hampered by a lack of farmer-facing
information and the general confusion of California’s water rights scheme. The State
Water Resources Control Board acknowledges that for riparian, prescriptive, or pre-1914
rights, “You can only tell for certain that you have one of these types of water rights if a
court has issued a decree that confirms that the right exists” (California State Water
Resources Control Board 2017g). Not only are the nature of these rights often unclear,
but, due to the exemption of pre-1914 rights, only about half of all water rights in the
state of California are regulated and monitored by the state. In addition to an opaque
water rights scheme, the water market size has stayed relatively flat since the 1990s in
part due to the difficulty of market entry and information.
In comparison, Australia employs a user-friendly centralized website with various
services and data tools. Any efforts by California to aggregate water trade information,
frequently asked questions about costs and processes, and other useful data could go a
long way to ensure that farmers are aware of market flexibilities to optimize their costs
and benefits.
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Finally, to ensure that this market is most efficient and the least distortive, it is
imperative that farmers face the true cost of water. California should therefore lobby and
engage in negotiations with the Bureau of Reclamation, which manages the Central
Valley Water Project, in order to taper off and eventually eliminate the estimated $60
billion annual subsidies for farmers.
While agriculture uses can face more honest water costs in order to incentivize
responsible drought management and minimize long-term costs, California can help
ensure that the increasingly large urban population is also making strides to minimize
wasteful water use. Governor Jerry Brown enacted innovative projects to remove lawns,
make low-water appliances available, and encourage collaboration between various state
agencies and localities.
However, Australia proves that making drought a long-term lifestyle change can
maximize aquifer refill during wetter times and mitigate costs during drought. If
residential Californians could reduce water use to levels similar to the average Australia,
the state could have saved 2 million acre-feet of water in 2009 (Cahill and Lund 2011, 1).
If California achieves maximum efficiency standards and technologies, residents could
improve their home water efficiency by 40 to 60 percent, which would save between 2
and 3.6 million acre-feet per year; and industry could improve water efficiency by 30 to
60 percent, which would save another 1.6 million acre-feet (Natural Resources Defense
Council and the Pacific Institute 2014b, 6). Installing rainwater capture systems is
another method to further increase residential water supply and decrease the amount
needed from water conveyance systems. Finally, a larger publicity campaign to reduce
the cultural value placed on water-soaking lawns—especially in southern California—can
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yield permanent and significant water reduction. Broader cultural awareness of drought,
and the constant need to shift lifestyles to lower water consumption, are necessary for
lasting drought reform.
To add more economic incentives to reduce wasteful water consumption and prepare
for drought, California’s utilities should look at opportunities to enact permanent
ordinances prohibiting the most wasteful water uses (as some Australian communities
do), rather than enacting much of these ordinances during drought and removing them in
the hopes of a wetter future. However, utilities, due to the nature of their cost function,
wish to maximize revenue by increasing the total amount of water sold. California’s 2016
mandated “stress-test,” which required that utilities prove they have the resources and
programs to provide water under stressed conditions for at least three years, shows great
potential to be modified and expanded.
By considering the projected scientific risks and costs of drought, state and local
utilities should attempt to achieve responsible water management by incentivizing
innovative and consistent drought preparation. This might come in the form of requiring
additional proof of “stress-test” preparations or making state funding for certain services
conditional on the presence of such drought strategies. And California, while respecting
the intent and valid purpose of Proposition 218 (ensuring that the government not charge
utility rates greater than the cost of services), must enact legislation allowing for water
utilities to charge block-based or allocation-based fees. The proposition already exempts
fees for gas and electricity, and water should be among them. Such inclusion would allow
localities to employ this cost-effective way to reduce water consumption from the highest
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water users (by roughly 20 percent after two years) without fear of court injunction
(Baerenklau, Schwabe, and Dinar 2014, 4).
Outside of the realm of addressing the demand and supply of water in California, the
state would do well to maximize system efficiency and fairness by ensuring that the State
Water Resources Control Board has the funding necessary to carry out its prescribed
enforcement role in many of the recent water regulations. The degree of enforcement for
many regulations and fines, such as for SGMA, is still unclear. Nonetheless, the good
intent of these reforms can only fully materialize with full enforcement.
Adequate information is a key component necessary for the Control Board to enforce
noncompliance and measure the effects of reform measures, and is an area which
California has not met international models. Australia conducts regular, more thorough,
and more types of water audits. In addition, Australia centralizes these data into regular
meta-reports, which are then publicized in easily-readable formats. California
experiences considerable gaps in reporting requirements for urban consumption and
groundwater use which can be amended by law or agency decree. In addition, scientific
agencies should be given more formal and foundational information-gathering roles, and
the Department of Water Resources or the State Water Resources Control board should
centralize data management.
These supply and demand focused measures, in addition to ensuring adequate
information and enforcement mechanisms, are vital to work within the current system of
California’s political framework to move towards forward-looking, evidence-based cost
mitigation. However, more basic structural changes, while requiring more political vision
and courage, can also pay dividends to more effectively respond to future drought. Both
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Australia’s and California’s recent histories have displayed trends towards increasing
collaborative problem-solving, as well as giving more power to higher levels of
government. In Australia, that has meant larger basin-wide power and federal
management involvement. In California, however, where the federal government plays
more of an emergency-relief role (in addition to a federal environmental agenda recently
thrown into great uncertainty), it will likely be up to the state to attempt to consolidate its
water management vision, increase collaboration between the various local water
agencies, fund research necessary to inform long-term sustainable goals, and ultimately
hold regions, basin, and localities accountable for noncompliance.
In these ways, the state of California can increase its water resiliency, flexibility, and
risk management. Serious obstacles to reform exist, such as legislative inertia, a
complicated water rights history, and limited government funds. However, cost
California at least $9 billion as currently calculated for the most recent drought. Looking
to an uncertain future with increased urban populations, food demands, less snowpack,
and hotter climates, any investment of both time and resources would likely pay
dividends for California’s environment, economy, and even security in the quality of life
for millions of Americans.
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